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banks.  financial  sector.
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variation  -7  i  ttrven'iGn  outconnes  (as  neasured  by post-  tWo  c-or  1nteHveOtionls especially  those  that
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* The findings, interpretations, and conclusions are those of the author and should not be
attributed to the World Bank, its Executive Board of Directors, or any of its member
countries.  I thank Jerry Caprio, George Clarke, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Phil Keefer, Ross
Levine, Nicolas Mathieu, Mary Shirley, and Colin Xu for many helpful suggestions.The past twenty  years  have  been  witness  to bank insolvencies  in nearly 100
countries. Both their size -- in many  cases,  the cost of bail-out  was greater than 15%  of
GDP -- and  the fact that these crises  often  recur,  reflect fundamental  weaknesses  in the
financial  sectors  of many  countries.' Moreover,  a growing  body of evidence  shows  that
financial  sector development  is important  for economic  growth. It should  come as little
surprise,  therefore,  that the World Bank  has increasingly  granted  loans  with
conditionalities  designed  to achieve  specific  financial  sector reforms. A key instrument
employed  by the Bank  has been  the Financial  Sector Adjustment  Loan (FSAL)  or, in the
case  of poorer countries,  Credit  (FSAC). 2 As described  in more detail  below,  FSALs  are
generally  more comprehensive  than other  types  of financial  sector  interventions,  and  tend
to concentrate  on those  reform  areas most closely  linked  to the operations  of deposit
banks. Since 1990,  their focus  has shifted  somewhat  from improving  prudential
regulations  and correcting  interest  rate distortions  to bank privatization  and re-
capitalization.  This paper examines  (1) whether  initial  conditions  in a recipient  country
explain  a substantial  amount  of the variation  in intervention  outcomes  (as measured  by
post-intervention  financial  deepening),  and (2) whether  the changing  nature  of
interventions  have  had implications  for their success.
I  Caprio  and  Klingebiel  (1996).
2  For ease of exposition,  we will use "FSALs"  to refer  to both loans  and credits.
Credits  are loans  that carry  a "concessionary"  interest  rate, a rate below  that charged  on
other Bank  loans. World Bank  loans  are administered  by the International  Bank  for
Reconstruction  and  Development  (IBRD). Credits  are handled  by the International
Development  Association  (IDA).Section  I uses a conceptual  framework  and a database  created  by the Bank's
Operations  Evaluation  Department  (OED)  to describe  the characteristics  of financial
sector loans  as they  have evolved  over time. Although  FSALs  have always  tended  to
cover more  reform  areas  than  other Bank  financial  sector adjustments,  their size (as
measured  by loan  funds  per resident,  or as a percentage  of total funds  lent to that country
by the Bank)  has increased  substantially  relative  to their levels  in the 1980s. That increase
coincided  with  both greater financial  insolvency  problems  in many  countries 3 and a shift  in
emphasis  in the Bank's loan  conditionalities.  Whereas  the FSALs  of the 1980s  focused
primarily  on incentive  distortions  that could  be righted  through  legislative  actions  (  g.,
non market-based  interest  rates), the emphases  in the 90s -- bank privatization  and re-
capitalization  - required  something  more. Ownership  changed  hands and bank capital
was replenished  but, unless  bankers'  underlying  incentives  changed  (either  through
improvements  in supervision  or other  regulation),  these interventions  often  were
ineffective  in spurring  financial  depth in comparison  with the earlier  interventions.
Sections  II and III, which  evaluate  the overall  success  of recent  FSALs  relative  to
both previous  ones and to other types  of financial  sector interventions,  attempt  to control
for factors  other than the nature  of the reform  so as to better isolate  the independent
effects  of changed  FSAL  emphasis.  Section  Im,  for example,  uses regression  analysis  to
hold constant  factors such as financial  sector and macroeconomic  conditions  at the time of
the loan  (including  deposit  bank credit  to the private  sector, inflation,  and openness  to
3  Caprio  and Klingebiel  (1996).
2international  trade). 4 Aside  from  helping  to isolate  the effect  of the change  in emphasis,
these initial  condition  variables  tell a story of their own -- recipient  countries  with an
under-developed  financial  sector,  low to moderate  inflation,  and an openness  to trade
experienced  the most financial  deepening  in the wake  of a loan. Importantly,  however,
controlling  for initial  conditions,  loans  that emphasized  bank privatization  exhibited  less
post-loan  deepening  than  those  that emphasized  other areas. In addition,  loans  that
emphasized  bank re-capitalization  but did  not also focus on improved  prudential
regulations  were linked  with somewhat  less  deepening  than those  loans  that did both.
Because  the Bank  undertook  many  of its financial  sector interventions  in the past
few years, it is premature  to evaluate  many  of these loans. As a result,  the number  of
observations  available  for the regressions  was small. To examine  the reliability  of the
regression  results,  therefore,  section  IV analyzes  four specific  cases  -- Pakistan,  the
Philippines,  Tanzania,  and Venezuela. The cases  underscore  the importance  of initial
conditions  in the outcomes  of financial  sector  loans. In addition,  however,  there is some
evidence  of the independent  effect  of the type of reform  on the level  of post-loan  financial
deepening. In short, the cases  provide  reasonable  support  for the regression  results.
Finally,  section  V concludes  and offers recommendations  as to best practice.
All  three variables  are measured  as a percentage  of GDP.
3I.  FSAL Characteristics
(A). Types of Reform
Reform identification in this paper is based on a recent OED methodology to
identify the presence or absence of policies in Bank-assisted financial  sector reform
programs across countries. 5 OED classified  financial sector policies in sixteen broad
categories.  The categories, which OED grouped according to their major objectives, are
given below:








Differential taxation/regulation of banks
Foreign ownership laws
(c) Improved Financial System Infrastructure
Central Bank law
Prudential regulations, banking law
Non-bank regulations
Money market 6
Rights and obligations of financial agents




See Financial Sector Reform:  A Review of World Bank Assistance, OED,
preliminary draft, February, 1997. I am deeply indebted to OED and, in particular,
Nicolas Mathieu, for providing the data that summarizes the individual  interventions.
Without it, this project would not have been possible.
6  Although the OED draft does not explicitly state that there is no overlap between
the "money market" category and "indirect monetary instruments," it appears that the
categories are mutually exclusive.
4To date, OED has applied  this methodology  to eighty-five  'adjustment  related
operations'  (including  twenty-four  FSALs)  in fifty-six  countries. This analysis  examines
the effect  of these policy  variables  on financial  sector outcomes  (in particular,  deepening
as measured  by M2/GDP)  for the most recent  operation  in each country. 7 In this way, one
can also test whether  prior operations  had a positive  effect  on current  ones. Of the fifty-
six potential  observations,  however,  less  than half  typically  enter into the analysis
presented  here  because  sufficient  time has not yet elapsed  since  the project's inception  to
evaluate  the outcomes.
For the purposes  of this research,  however,  the OED classification  procedure
carries  some  limitations.  For example,  OED  considered  a reform  to have  been  attempted
largely  on the basis  of the objectives  (summarized  in the policy  matrix)  stated in the
President's  Report  that accompanied  each loan. The matrix  was,  however,  an ex-ante
7  Lack of time series  data for other financial  measures  compels  the reliance  on
general measures  of financial  depth (e  . M2) in assessing  the outcomes  of these  loans.
This is unfortunate  because  the loans  presumably  had more objectives  than increasing
depth. For example,  Levine (1996)  highlights  five main  functions  of a financial  system  --
to facilitate  the trading, hedging,  diversifying,  and pooling  of risk;  to allocate  resources;  to
monitor managers  and exert corporate control;  to mobilize  savings;  and, finally,  to
facilitate  the exchange  of goods and services. Improvements  in these five areas  are only
indirectly  and imperfectly  captured  by changes  in financial  depth. Indeed,  a complete
analysis  of the effects  of financial  sector adjustment  loans  would likely  require  a different
set of dependent  variables  for each of the five functions  described  above.
OED has made a serious  attempt  to move  beyond  M2/GDP,  creating  several
financial  sector and banking  system  time series,  but data discontinuities  do not yet allow
econometric  analysis. A minimal  dataset would  include,  for three years prior to and after
each FSAL, comparable  data on financial  deepening,  banking  supervision  (number  of
salaries,  number  of supervisors,  etc.), portfolio  quality  in the banking  system,  and
prevailing  interest  rates. This standard  template  would greatly  facilitate  analysis  of the
Bank's financial  sector interventions.
5indication  of planned  reform,  not necessarily  an ex-post measure of actual reform. During
the course of a loan,  plans  may  change. Some  reforms  are scrapped,  others  are altered. In
Pakistan's  FSAL,  for example,  a major component  was the restructuring  of many  state-
owned  banks. Upon  implementation,  the Government  decided  that its restructuring  efforts
would  be less effective  than  bank privatizations.  Although  the Bank  later applauded  the
shift  in emphasis, 8 the OED classification  indicates  that the Pakistan  FSAL attempted
restructuring  but not privatization.  Of course,  that classification  may  be partially  accurate
in that, although  Pakistan's  was a 1989  FSAL,  little  privatization  had occurred  as of
1996.9  The episode  underscores  two problems  with  the reform  data -- although  planned
reform  is different  than actual  reform,  and substantial  reform  is different  than minor
reform,  those  differences  are sometimes  difficult  to capture  in simple  dummy  variables
which  are based  largely  on the expressed  intentions  of the parties  to these loans. That
said, to the extent  that expressed  intentions  are reliable  indicators  of ensuing  reform  and
that the Bank's loan  documentation  adequately  summarizes  those intentions,  the
measurement  error associated  with the OED  variables  should  not be debilitating.  Indeed,
given  the  judgments  that ex-post  reform  variables  would  have  entailed  (What  form did
privatization  take? Was  the re-capitalization  sufficient?  Were prudential  regulations
8  World  Bank, "Pakistan  FSAL:  Project Completion  Report," March 16, 1995,  pp.
6-11.
9  More generally,  the privatization  policy  category  identified  by OED is broadly
defined  and does not permit  one to determine  what form eventual  privatizations  took.
Data on what assets were sold to whom  and at what price  were not available  in a
systematic  format,  although  OED's project  audit reports did  provide  good information  in
some  cases.
6adequately  strengthened?),  OED'  s reliance  on ex-ante  reform  dummy  variables  was
sensible.
(B). Changed  Emphasis  in Financial  Sector  Adjustment  Lending
In the early 1  990s  financial  sector adjustment  lending,  in particular  FSALs,  became
far more prevalent  than in the '80s. In addition,  loan size -- measured  in dollars  lent  per
resident  or as a percentage  of a recipient  country's total World Bank  loan portfolio  --
increased  substantially  (See Appendix  2 for details). A shift  in emphasis  coincided  with
the elevated  importance  of FSALs,  which  is reflected  in the percentage  of interventions
that incorporated  each reform  area (Table 1.  1). With  respect  to changes  over time,  the
reform  areas  can be separated  into four categories:  (1) those that were points  of emphasis
prior to 1990  that became  even  more  prevalent  thereafter,  (2) those that were emphasized
early on that became  somewhat  less  important  in the latter period,  (3) those that were not
emphasized  in the early  period that became  substantially  more so later on, and (4) those
that were not particularly  emphasized  in either  period. Among  the two reform  areas in the
first group,  bank re-capitalization  was the most prevalent. In the earlier  period,  three of
four FSALs  had a re-capitalization  component;  in the latter, 86% of them did. Similarly,
bank supervision,  although  not neglected  in the early period (63% inclusion  rate), became
a component  in 79% of the latter  FSALs. Clearly,  this first group is comprised  of two
reform  areas of substantial  importance  to the Bank.
7Table 1.1
Changes in FSALs Over Time
(Broken  Down  Bv Reform Area)
Reform Area  Probabilitv of Inclusion  Probabilit  of Inclusion  Change
Post-1990  Pre-1990
Group I
Bank Re-Capitalization  86%  75%  +11%
Bank Supervision  79%  63%  +16%
Group n
Prudential Regulations  71%  88%  -17%
Non-Bank Regulations  64%  88%  -24%
Interest Rate Distortion  64%  75%  -11%
Ind. MonetaLy  Control  50%  50%  0%
Group  Ill
Bank Privatization  50%  13%  +37%
Other Bank Ins. Reform  43%  13%  +30%
Group TV
Directed Credit  29%  38%  -9%
Differential Bank Reg.  29%  38%  -9%
Central Bank Law  29%  25%  +4%
Rights/Obs. Fin. Agents  21%  38%  -17%
Companies Law  14%  25%  -11%
Liberalize  Capital  Acct.  14%  0%  +14%
Money Market Dev.  0%  13%  -13%
Foreign Ownership  0%  0%  0%
N=8  N=14
No doubt,  the second  group  also contains  reform  areas that  were  and are of
substantial  import  to the Bank.  However,  each of these  areas lost  some ground  to
supervision  and re-capitalization  in the latter  period.  Prudential  regulations,  non-bank
regulations, and interest rate distortions all had a probability of inclusion greater than 75%
in the  early period  but not in the  latter.  Indirect  monetary  control  remained  at 50% across
both periods,  and thus was more difficult  to classify. While  that area wasn't neglected  in
8FSALs,  it wasn't emphasized  as heavily  as the other reform  areas in groups  one and two.
For purposes  of this paper  we refer  to those reform  areas in group one as being  in their
ascendancy;  those in group two (excluding  indirect  monetary  control)  as being  in decline
(although  clearly  still  important). Those  in group three are also in ascendancy,  although
their probability  of inclusion  in the latter period still  ranks below  that of groups  one and
two. We make  a distinction  between  the two areas in group three -- bank privatization
and other bank institutional  reforms. Because  privatization  only applies  to FSALs  in
countries  where  banks  were publicly  owned, and the probability  of inclusion  is calculated
over all  FSALs,  the figures  in Table 1.1 likely  understate  this area's importance.  By
contrast,  it is difficult  to argue that the relatively  nebulous  "other bank  institutional
reform"  category  is not potentially  relevant  for all FSALs. It seems  safe  to conclude,
therefore,  that privatization  was more heavily  emphasized  by the Bank  than  was other
bank institutional  reform,  especially  in later FSALs. As a result, in the remainder  of the
paper, privatization  joins re-capitalization  and supervision  in the ascending  group.
Prudential  regulations,  non-bank  regulations,  and interest  rate distortions  are in the
descending  (but emphasized)  group. Indirect  monetary  control  and other institutional
reforms  are grouped with  those reforms  that were not particularly  important  in either
period --  directed  credit, differential  bank laws, central  bank laws, capital  account
liberalization,  money  market  development,  and foreign  ownership.'° While  each of these
'°  A case could  be made  that, much  like  the privatization  category,  the figures  in
Table 1.1 may  understate  the importance  of areas such as directed  credit. That is, the
category  is only relevant  for FSALs  in countries  that had directed  credit  problems,  but the
probability  of the reform  area's inclusion  in an operation  is computed  over all FSALs.
Privatization  is, however,  separated  from these others  for two reasons. First, its post-
1990  inclusion  rate is higher (or as high  in the case of indirect  monetary  control)  than that
9categories  may  have  been  especially  important  in a particular  intervention,  none of them is,
on average,  particularly  characteristic  of FSALs. The focus of the analysis  is, therefore,
on the six reform  areas  in the ascending  and descending  groups.
The changed  emphasis  in FSALs  was not shared  by non-FSAL  financial  sector
lending  operations  (hereafter  non-FSALs)  as the two have  become  increasingly  distinct
developmental  tools for the Bank  (See Appendix  3 for details). FSALs  have  always  been
substantially  focused  on reforms  related  directly  to banks' capital  structure  and operations
(re-capitalization,  supervision,  prudential  regulations,  and interest  rate distortions)  or
indirectly  to banks  through  their  primary  competitors  (non-bank  regulations)." Emphasis
on capital  structure  and governance,  moreover,  has been  further  underscored  by the
emergence  of privatization  as a significant  reforn area. As noted, however,  within  this
group of bank  reform  areas,  some  have  come  to be increasingly  dominated  by FSALs
(privatization,  re-capitalization,  and supervision),  others slightly  less  so (prudential
regulation  and non-bank  regulation).  Although  there appears  to be no obvious  qualitative
distinction  that can explain  the emergence  of the two groups,  it does appear  that
successful  reform  in the ascending  group may  be more difficult  to achieve  than in the
descending  group -- those  in the latter  group are largely  legislative  reforns while  those in
of all of the "not emphasized"  reform  areas. Second,  privatization  exhibited  a large
increase  from one period  to the next. The majority  of those areas  in the not emphasized
group experienced  declines  ranging  from nine  to seventeen  percent. Among  those  that
had an increase,  only  "other bank institutional  reform"  had one that came  close  to the
increase  in privatization. To separate  privatization  from this group,  therefore,  does not
appear  to be misleading.
11  See Appendix  4 for additional  summary  data on the relative  importance  of reform
areas for FSALs  and non-FSALs  across  both periods.
10the former  may  require  substantial  institution  building  within  banks  to be successful. It is
also clear  that reform  areas  pertaining  to financial  actors not closely  related  to banks
(financial  agents)  or to reforms  that have a less direct  effect  on bank operations
(companies  laws) increasingly  have  become  the province  of non-FSALs.
In summary,  the nature  of FSALs  has changed  over time. Although  their focus is
concentrated  in the same  areas,  the relative  importance  of reform  types has changed  in
favor of privatization,  re-capitalization,  and supervision.  In addition,  non-FSAL  financial
sector interventions  have  exhibited  very different  changes. Increasingly,  their emphasis
has shifted  to areas not emphasized  by FSALs,  those less intimately  connected  to banks'
operations  including  the rights  and obligations  of financial  agents,  companies  laws,  and
money  market  development.  Does their more  comprehensive  nature  or differential  focus
have  implications  for the success  of FSALs  relative  to other  types of financial
interventions?  Moreover,  has the increased  emphasis  on potentially  more tedious  reform
areas had implications  for the success  of FSALs,  at least  regarding  short term benefits? It
may, for example,  be difficult  to privatize  and re-capitalize  banks while  making  major
revisions  to supervision,  all within  the context  of a quick-disbursing  FSAL. We address
these issues in the next section.
H. Performance  of FSALs: Summary  Statistics
(A). FSALs vs. Non-FSALs,  Broken  Down  by Period
The summary  statistics  indicate  that, on average,  the Bank  realized  greater
improvements  in the banking  sector when it tailored  loans  specifically  to financial  sector
11adjustment  through  FSALs  as opposed  to including  financial  sector components  in non-
FSALs  (See Appendix  5 for summary  statistics  for the entire  period 1985-95). FSALs  did
not, however,  outperform  non-FSALs  over  the entire  period -- post-  1990  FSALs  were no
more successful  than  non-FSALs  (Table  2.1). In terms of post-intervention
improvements  in M2, liquid  liabilities,  and deposit  bank credit  to the private  sector as
percentages  of GDP (M2/GDP,  LL/GDP,  and DBPC/GDP,  respectively),  pre-1990
FSALs  substantially  outperformed  both later ones and non-FSALs  from either  period.' 2
Although  pre-  1  990 non-FSALs  appear  to have  been  the least  effective  subset  -
"improvements"  on the three measures  hovered  between  zero and one percent in absolute
value,  often  with the incorrect  sign  -- post-1990  interventions  (both FSALs  and non-
FSALs)  were not substantially  better. The relatively  large  average  improvement  in
M2/GDP  in the wake  of post-  1990  FSALs  (+3.1%)  is driven  by one observation,  Tanzania
(+8.9%). After eliminating  it from  the sample,  the average  improvement  in M2/GDP was
only 1.17%,  a figure  quite similar  to those for non-FSALs. Similarly,  the relatively  large
improvement  in M2/GDP  and  LL/GDP  that was associated  with post-1990  non-FSALs
was driven  heavily  by Nicaragua. Ignoring  that observation,  the average  improvements  in
12  Admittedly,  small  sample  problems  make the averages  in Table  2.1 somewhat  less
reliable  than one might  like. The source  of the DBPC,  M2, LL, and GDP data is the IMF's
International  Financial  Statistics  Yearbook  (1996). DBPC includes  all assets of deposit
money  banks classified  as claims  on the private  sector. M2 includes  the sum  of all
currency  held  outside  of banks,  demand  deposits  other than those of the central
government,  and time, savings,  and foreign  currency  deposits  of "resident  sectors other
than  the central  government."  Liquid  liabilities  include  M2 plus  demand  and interest
bearing  liabilities  of non-bank  financial  intermediaries  such  as savings  banks,  postal savings
institutions,  and finance  companies. In the individual  country  data, DBPC data are
reported on line 22d, M2 data on line 351,  and LL data on 551.
12M2/GDP  and LL/GDP  were .62% and .90%, respectively  -- figures substantially  similar  to
those for pre-1990  FSALs. 13
Table 2.1
Changes  in Performance  Indicators  Over  Time,  FSALs  and Non-FSALs
FSALs  Non-FSALs
Indicator  Pre-1990  Post-1990  Pre-1990  Post-1990
(% Change,  3 Yrs.  (%  Change,  3 Yrs.  (% Change,  3 Yrs.  (%  Change,  3 Yrs.
After  Intervention)  After Intervention)  After Intervention)  After Intervention)
As a % of GDP:
M2  +5.43  (6.41)*  +3.09  (5.46)  -1.17  (4.30)  +2.78  (7.25)
Liquid  Liabilities  +6.32  (6.90)  -0.25 (7.12)  +1.03  (2.10)  +4.47  (8.74)
Dep  Bank  Pr Cred  +4.38  (8.43)  -0.23  (5.66)  4.48 (2.02)  +0.45 (11.3)
Non  Bank  Pr Cred  -0.04  (1.35)  -1.14  (1.68)  -0.66  (1.26)  +0.19  (0.49)
Cen  Bank  Pr  Cred  -0.06  (0.19)  -0.04  (0.08)  -1.97  (3.66)  +0.001  (.003)
Fixed  Cap.  Fonn.  +0.06  (2.14)  +3.84  (5.83)  +0.93  (2.72)  -0.28  (4.69)
As a % of GDP
(Outliers
Omitted)' 4:
M2  +4.13  +1.17  -1.17  +0.62
Liquid Liabilities  +5.00  -0.25  +1.03  +0.90
Dep  Bank  Pr Cred  +2.22  -0.23  -0.48  +0.45
Non  Bank  Pr Cred  -0.04  -1.14  -0.66  +0.19
Cen  Bank  Pr Cred  -0.06  -0.04  -0.48  +.001
Fixed  Cap.  Form  +0.06  +0.19  +0.93  -0.28
* Standard  Deviations  in Parentheses
The only remaining performance indicators that do not tip in favor of pre-1990
FSALs are the average improvement (that is, decline) in central bank credit to the private
sector as a percentage of GDP (CB/GDP), which favors pre-1990 non-FSALs, and the
figure for fixed capital formation relative to GDP (FCF/GDP), which favors post-1990
13  The average improvements associated with pre-1990 FSALs are, of course, also
sensitive to individual observations. Excluding the largest observed improvement from the
calculation (namely Mexico, whose improvement on these measures ranged from 14-
20%), the average change for pre-1990 FSALs in M2/GDP, LL/GDP, and DBPC/GDP
was 4.13%, 5.00%, and 2.22%, respectively. These figures are substantially higher than
the corrected figures for post-1990 FSALs and all non-FSALs.
14  As discussed  in the text.
13FSALs. Similar  to other figures  for post-19 9O  FSALs,  FCF/GDP  is heavily  influenced  by
two observations,  Peru and Rwanda  (9.4% and 9.3%, respectively).  "  After removing
those, the FCF/GDP  improvement  drops  to 0.  19%,  which  is simnilar  to that for pre-  1990
FSALs. It is puzzling  that the banking  indicators  perform  relatively  well  for pre-90
FSALs  relative  to the other three subsets  of interventions  while  FCF/GDP  improvements
are relatively  comparable  (and meager). One  possible  explanation  is that, because  FCF
data was not available  for as many  countries  as was M2 and DBPC data, the average
improvement  figures  may  be less  reliable  than  the others. Alternatively,  FCF/GDP  may
measure  something  quite distinct  from financial  sector  development  as measured  by, say,
DBPC/GDP. In particular,  improvements  in indicators  that measure  relatively  liquid
assets (DBPC)  may  precede  those for indicators  that measure  illiquid  assets (FCF).
With respect  to reducing  central  bank credit  to the private sector,  pre-  1990  non-
FSALs  performed  better  than other interventions.  That result is, to some  extent, also
driven  by one observation  (Chile,  -8.4%). 16  Even after  correction,  however,  the
improvements  are somewhat  more  pronounced  for pre-90  non-FSALs  than  for the other
subsets  (-0.48%).  '7  However,  like  the FCF/GDP  indicator,  the CB/GDP  improvement
may  not measure  precisely  what was desired. For most of the countries  in the sample,
central  bank credit  to the private sector was at or near  zero at the time of intervention.
15  No other countries  in the sample  exceeded  5% improvement  on this measure.
16  No other country  in the sample  had a CB/GDP  figure  higher  than 1.0%  at the time
of the intervention.
17  Indeed,  central  bank law was a point of emphasis  for non-FSALs  prior to 1990
(see Appendix  3).
14These countries  could  not, therefore,  reduce  CB/GDP. The improvement  for pre-  1990
non-FSALs  may  merely  be an indication  that the handful  of countries  with room to
improve  on this measure  (i.e., substantial  central  bank credit  to the private sector)  were
grouped  in this particular  subset. Indeed,  when one looks only at those countries  that had
moderately  high  levels  of central  bank credit  to the private  sector at the time of the
intervention  (between  0.3 and 1.0%),  the improvements  for the four subsets  become  much
more similar,  and  pre-1990  FSALs  again outperform  all others (-0.54%  for pre-90  FSALs,
-0.17% for post-90  FSALs,  -0.48%  for pre-90  non-FSALs,  and +.001 for post-90 non-
FSALs). To summarize,  CB and FCF measurement  problems  aside,  pre-1990  FSALs
were the most effective  subset  of interventions  in terms of banking  sector development
especially  as reflected  in M2, liquid  liabilities,  and deposit  banks' credit  to the private
sector.  For Post-1990  FSALs  and  non-FSALs,  most ofthe average  changes  in these
indicators  were so small  as to be attributable  to noise,  which  raises  the possibility  that the
operations  have had  no impact,  or that it make  require  more  than three years  for
improvements  to take hold. The remainder  of the paper explores  (I) why  other types  of
interventions  generally  fared  worse than early  FSALs,  and (2) whether  the shift  in FSALs'
emphasis  described  in section  I played  a role in their relatively  poor performance  after
1990.
(B).  Post-Intervention Performance and Initial Conditions in the Recipient Country
To isolate the effect  of the change  in project emphasis  on post-intervention
improvement, other relevant factors must be held constant.  Among the most important
are, perhaps, initial conditions. Although, on average, initial conditions did not vary
15substantially  across  FSALs  and non-FSALs  (and  thus the differences  in average
performance  cannot  be easily  attributed  to them),  the success  of individual  interventions
was quite sensitive  to them.' 8 In particular,  improvements  were largest  in those countries
that had a relatively  stable  macroeconomic  environment  and a relatively  under-developed
financial  sector at the time of the intervention.  For example,  in countries  with relatively
"low" inflation  (less  than  25%) and insubstantial  financial  sector development
(DBPC/GDP  less  than  20%),  the average  improvement  in M2 was 6.37%  three years  after
intervention.  In high-inflation,  low  financial  development  countries  (inflation  greater than
25%, DBPC/GDP  less  than 20%),  improvements  were much  smaller  (+3.71%).19  In high
financial  development  countries,  "improvements"  were even  smaller.  High-development,
low-inflation  countries  (Group  III) experienced  reductions  in M2/GDP  (-0.74%). Worse
yet, the average  improvement  for Group IV (high  development,  high  inflation  countries)
was -3.92%. The  M2 improvement  breakdowns  indicate  clearly  that interventions  have
fared  best in countries  with relatively  low initial  inflation  and  under-developed  private
banking  sectors. 20 The predictability  of post-intervention  outcomes,  moreover,  appears
18  See Appendix  6 for additional  details  on initial  conditions  in countries  receiving
FSALs vs. non-FSALs.
19  If the largest  observation  is dropped  from each of these categories,  the differences
become  even  more pronounced  -- Group I countries  averaged  a 6.24%  improvement;
Group II countries  1.55%. These  figures  remain  higher  than  those for Group III and IV
countries.
20  Of course,  the number  of observations  in each of these groups  is quite small,  so the
statistical  significance  of differences  in means  is suspect. Also,  the use of DBPC/GDP  as a
measure  of financial  sector development  may,  in some  instances,  be misleading  -- in
countries  with predominantly  publicly-owned  deposit  banks,  a high  DBPC/GDP  figure
may  merely  indicate  a substantial  amount of credit  directed  to government  allies  in the
private sector. We might  expect such countries  to experience  less financial  deepening
after an intervention. In general,  however,  we assume  that these  problems  are not severe
16to be much  lower  for countries  experiencing  high inflation  as indicated  by the relatively
high standard  deviations  on the average  improvement  measures.
Table 2.2
% Changes in Performance Indicators, All Financial Sector Adjustments
Controlling for Initial Macroeconomic  And Financial Sector Conditions
Macroeconomic  and
Financial Sector Conditions
Indicator  Group  I  Group  n  Group  EmI  Group  IV
Inflation  < 25%;  Inflation > 25%;  Inflation < 25%;  Inflation > 25%;
Dep Bank Pr Cred  Dep Bank Pr Cred  Dep Bank Pr Cred  Dep Bank Pr Cred
< 20% of GDP  < 20%  of GDP  > 20% of GDP  > 20% of GDP2'
As a % of GDP:
M2  +6.37 (3.86)*  +3.71  (7.15)  -0.74 (3.36)  -3.92  (5.88)
(M2/GDP)  N=6  N=6  N=7  N=2
Liquid Liabilities  +7.21  (3.99)  +2.09  (7.88)  -1.04 (3.68)
(LL/GDP)  N=5  N=5  N=4  N=0
Dep Bank Pr Cred  +3.47  (5.27)  +3.26  (9.09)  -0.39 (4.82)  -7.20 (12.89)
(DBPC/GDP)  N=7  N=6  N=7  N=2
Non Bank Pr Cred  +0.31  (1.02)  -1.17 (1.66)  -0.50 (1.26)  0.00 (0.00)
(NB/GDP)  N=7  N=6  N=6  N=2
Cen Bank Pr Cred  +0.15  (0.04)  -0.12  (0.22)  -1.20 (3.17)  -0.51 (0.89)
(CB/GDP)  N=7  N=6  N=7  N=3
Fixed Cap.  Form.  +0.28  (4.57)  +0.96 (5.13)  +0.85 (2.81)  +0.31  (0.57)
(FCF/GDP)  N=8  N=6  N=7  N=2
-Standard  Deviations  in Parentheses
The inflation results should come as no surprise, as the banking sector is less apt to
grow when savers,  borrowers,  and bankers  face dramatic  currency  volatility. The financial
development  results are, however,  less intuitive. Apparently,  we can expect  better
developed  financial  sectors to grow more slowly  as they approach an "appropriate"  level
and that DBPC/GDP  is, in most instances,  a reasonable  indicator  of financial  sector
development.
21  As described  below, due to data measurement  problems,  Nicaragua  was excluded
from the regression  results and from the M2/GDP,  DBPC/GDP,  and  FCF/GDP  figures  for
group IV.  See fn. 34.
17relative  to GDP. 22 These results  are, moreover,  robust across  the other indicators. The
liquid  liabilities  results  closely  mirror those  for M2 development.  Those  for deposit  bank
credit are also quite similar,  except  that, among  less  financially  developed  countries,  the
disparities  between  those  with high  and low inflation  are less  pronounced  -- low-inflation
had 3.47%  average  improvements,  high-inflation  3.26%. The standard  deviation  for the
high inflation  countries  was,  however,  large  relative  to that for low-inflation  countries,  yet
further  indication  of the hit-or-miss  nature  of adjustment  in high inflation  countries. The
DBPC/GDP  "improvements"  for countries  with better-developed  financial  sectors  were
dismal,  especially  for those  that simultaneously  experienced  high  inflation  (-7.2%).
Perhaps  because  banks  were  the focus of the financial  sector operations  studied  here,
credit  issued  by non-bank  financial  intermediaries  improved  little (if at all),  irrespective  of
initial  conditions.  With  respect  to central  bank credit  to the private sector,  countries  with
better-developed  financial  sectors  experienced  larger reductions  than others. This
appears  to be the only  indicator  that tips clearly  in favor of the better-developed,  although,
given  the potential  measurement  problems  associated  with CB/GDP  described  above, that
victory  may  be illusory.  Finally,  with respect  to fixed  capital  formation  improvements,  the
disparities  between  subsets  are small. Again,  FCF/GDP,  a measure  of relatively  illiquid
assets,  does not display  the cross-group  distinctions  of the other  indicators  of financial
depth.
In short, initial  conditions  appear  to have had implications  for the success  of Bank
interventions.  The data indicate  that the most substantial  improvement  has typically
22  We discuss  a possible  theoretical  rationale  for this result in the next section.
18occurred  in countries  with both stable  macroeconomic  environments  and under-developed
banking  systems. 23 However,  because  initial  conditions  were, on average,  very similar
across intervention  types, it is unlikely  that they  can be solely  responsible  for early
FSALs' relative  success. More likely  candidates  include  either  the nature of the reform  or
the extent of institutional  development  in the recipient  country  (competence  of bank
supervisors,  enforceability  of contracts,  etc.). In addition,  it may  be that, even  after
controlling  for all of these  factors,  FSALs  are somehow  different  from other financial
sector interventions.  Perhaps  the Bank allocates  resources  differently  when it devotes  an
entire  project  to financial  sector  reform  as opposed  to incorporating  financial  components
in more general  adjustment  loans  as it did in many  non-FSALs.  In the next  section,  we
use simple  regression  analysis  to control  for all of these factors  -- initial  conditions,  reform
areas covered,  institutional  development,  and intervention  type (FSAL  vs. non-FSAL).
HI. Regression  Analysis
(A). Hypotheses
Regression  analysis  is included  here  for two reasons  -- to control  simultaneously
for institutional,  sectoral,  and macroeconomic  conditions  in summarizing  the results  of the
Bank's financial  sector interventions  and to help select  the most telling  cases,  which  will
be discussed  in further  detail in the next section. Among  the variables  used to explain
intervention  success  is openness  to international  trade which  is often linked  to economic
23  Again,  however,  these differences  in means  are less reliable  than one might like due
to the small  number  of observations  in each  group.
19growth. 24 To the extent  that openness  contributes  to growth  that increases  borrowers'
net worth,  one would  expect  these improvements  in the real sector to be reflected  in the
growth of the banking  sector. Gertler  and Rose argue cogently  that, in a world of
infornational  asymmetry,  borrower  net worth is at the core of the link  between  finance
and aggregate  economic  activity. 25 Because  greater net worth increases  a borrower's
potential  stake  in an investment,  incentives  are aligned  more closely  between  borrower  and
banker  thus  reducing  the premnium  on funds. As a result, the banking  sector expands.
Also,  to the extent  that openness  diversifies  some  risks  that an economy  faces  regarding
input or output prices,  we might  expect  it to be less susceptible  to the intemal  shocks  that
cause  large declines  in borrower  net worth in relatively  closed economies. 26 All  else equal,
therefore,  we expect  openness  as measured  by exports or imports  as a percentage  of GDP
(EXP/GDP  or IMP/GDP,  respectively)  to be positively  related  to growth  in the financial
sector.2'
24  From the numerous  cross-country  studies  of economic  growth,  one robust finding
is that, holding  other relevant  factors  constant,  there is a positive  correlation  between  the
share  of investment  in GDP and  the average  share  of trade in GDP. Investment  share,  in
tum, is positively  and robustly  correlated  with average  growth rates. A possible  intuition
underlying  this result is that openness  to intemational  markets  enhances  productivity  by
encouraging  specialization  that would  be unprofitable  in smaller  markets. Levine  and
Renelt (1992),  p. 953. Levine  and Renelt  review  a number  of cross-country  growth
regression  analyses. Many including  Korrnendi  and Meguire  (1985),  Barro (1991), and
Romer  (1990) also find  strong correlations  between  investment  and growth. On the link
between  outward  orientation  and growth  in developing  countries,  see Dollar  ( 1992)  and
Pritchett (1991).
25  Gertler  and Rose (1994), p. 28.
26  Of course, an open economy  would  be more susceptible  to external  shocks. The
implicit  assumption,  therefore,  is that the diversification  opportunities  afforded  by
openness  result  in shocks  that are, on average,  smaller  than those  faced by an identical,  but
closed economy.
27  As Levine  and Renelt  are quick  to point  out, findings  regarding  EXP/GDP  and
investment,  or EXP/GDP  and growth can also  be obtained  almost  identically  using  total
20The growth  literature  points  to an additional  explanatory  variable  that we should
consider:  initial  real income  per capita.  The convergence  hypothesis,  as it has come to be
known,  holds  that a poor country  tends to grow faster  than a rich one. The underlying
theoretical  intuition  is that, given  a decreasing  marginal  product for capital,  rich countries
receive  less  growth  per unit of additional  investment  than do poor ones. One  would
expect  that, for a given  level of additional  investment,  poorer countries  would  "catch up"
to richer countries. In this way,  real incomes  in different  countries  should  tend to
converge. While  there is little  empirical  support  for unconditional  convergence, 2' a
number  of researchers  have  found support  for conditional  convergence. That is, there is a
robust negative  partial  correlation  between  initial  income  in a country  and real GDP
growth, but only  if other relevant  factors  such as investment  (as a share  of GDP) are held
constant. 29 The result  may  have  implications  for the development  of the financial  sector.
Gertler  and Rose find strong  evidence  that countries  with higher  income  (and thus higher
borrower net worth) have  deeper  financial  systems. 30 We would  expect, therefore,  that
countries  with high  per capita  income  at the time of an intervention  would also have
relatively  well-developed  financial  systems  as measured  by DBPC/GDP  (one of the initial
trade or import  share  measures. As a result, "studies  that use export indicators  should  not
be interpreted  as studying  the relationship  between  growth and exports per se but rather as
studying  the relationship  between  growth and trade defined  more broadly." Levine  and
Renelt  (1992),  p. 959.
2S  See DeLong  (1988) and Romer  (1987). Pritchett  (1995) estimnates  that the ratio of
the incomes  of the richest  to the poorest countries  increased  at least sixfold  between 1870
and today.
29  See Barro (1991),  Mankiw  et al. (1992), and Levine  and Renelt  (1992).
30  Gertler  and Rose (1994), p. 40.
21conditions  from Section  II). As a result,  initial  GDP per capita and DBPC/GDP  may
perform  similar  roles in explaining  real sector  growth which,  if Gertler  and Rose are to be
believed,  should  be linked  to the post-intervention  development  of a country's financial
system. We might,  therefore,  expect  a negative  partial  correlation  between  post-
intervention  financial  sector development  and either  initial  DBPC/GDP  or initial  per capita
GDP. Inflation,  the other initial  condition  from Section  II, is, of course,  also expected  to
have  a negative  partial  correlation  with financial  development.  With respect  to initial
conditions,  therefore,  explanatory  variables  will  include  the inflation  rate, trade variables
(EXP/GDP  or IMPt/GDP),  and  DBPC/GDP  or real GDP per capita, all measured  in the
year of the intervention.
More recent research  on growth  has emphasized  the important  role that
institutions  may  play. In particular,  both real GDP  growth and investment  rates have  been
linked  to the quality  of a country's  institutions.  The Gertler-Rose  hypothesis  suggests  that
any  income  growth, even  if born of institutional  development,  should  also  be reflected  in
deeper  financial  systems. In the regressions  that follow  we would,  therefore,  expect a
positive  partial  correlation  between  post-intervention  financial  sector development  and
institutional  development.  To measure  institutional  quality  in the recipient  country,  we
use indices  created  by Knack  and Keefer  based  on indicators  compiled  by two private
international  investment  risk services,  the International  Country  Risk Guide  (ICRG)  and
Business  Environmental  Risk Intelligence  (BERI). 3'  The Knack and Keefer  indices  are
31  Knack and Keefer  (1995), pp. 225-6.
22averages  of a number  of indicators  including  quality  of the bureaucracy,  corruption  in
government,  the rule of law,  government  expropriation  risk (of private  property),  contract
enforceability,  and infrastructure  quality. Descriptions  of the individual  indicators  and
additional  details  regarding  the construction  of the indices  are found in Appendix  7. While
none of the indicators  deal  with financial  issues  per se, each may  provide  some  indication
of the stability  that lenders  and  borrowers  might  expect  within  the financial  system. For
example,  bank supervision  may  be best in countries  whose bureaucratic  quality  is high.
Similarly,  corrupt  governments  may  be more  likely  to direct  credit on a non-market  basis
to preferred  personal  uses,  and to build  up large  arrears. Governments  that repudiate
contracts,  expropriate  property,  and do not follow  the rule of law, moreover,  may  be more
willing  to enact  policies  that seriously  alter the value of deposits  and loans  (g.  through
abrupt currency  devaluations,  or unpaid  deposit  insurance  claims  in the event of bank
failures). In turn, depositors  (and lenders)  that expect arbitrary  treatment  from their
government  may  be less  likely  to channel  investable  resources  through  formal
intermediaries.  In short, while  these are, of course, not perfect  indicators,  the indices  may
provide  a reasonable  measure  of institutional  stability  in the financial  sector. Like the
initial  macroeconomic  and financial  sector conditions,  institutional  conditions  are
measured  in the year of the intervention.
The remaining  explanatory  variables  are also institutional  in nature, except  that
they capture features specific  to the Bank and the intervention.  Most of them have  been
described  elsewhere  in the paper. For example,  we use the policy  variables  identified  by
23OED (described  earlier)  as dummy  variables  to control  for the reform  areas covered  by the
intervention.  In this way,  we can test whether  specific  reforms  have,  on average,  met with
more success  than others  (other relevant  factors  held  constant). In particular,  we can test
whether  the relatively  poor performance  of post-  1990  interventions  can be traced to the
increased  emphasis  on particular  reforms  (privatization,  re-capitalization,  and supervision).
In addition,  to test whether  FSALs  are intrinsically  distinct  from other Bank  interventions,
we include  an FSAL  dummy. Finally,  to test whether  the comprehensiveness  of an
intervention  affects  its success,  we include  a continuous  variable  measuring  the total
number  of reform  areas  covered. On an a priori  basis,  it is difficult  to know whether
comprehensive  interventions  are beneficial,  or whether  they overly  complicate  matters.
(B). Results
It should  be emphasized  at the outset  that, given  data limitations  and  the myriad
factors  that may  affect  financial  sector performance  in the years  immediately  subsequent  to
an intervention,  one might  not expect  results  to be as robust  as recent ones  from the
growth  literature;  there, growth  rates and some  explanatory  variables  are averaged  over
long time periods. 32 In addition,  whereas  most of those studies  use samples  of 50-100
countries,  the sample  here is much smaller  (twenty-three  observations). As noted above,
because  the IFS data run only  through 1995  (for those countries  whose data is complete),
32  Robust  growth results,  the focus of Levine  and Renelt (1992),  are also found in
the institutional  work of Knack and  Keefer  (1995). Knack  and Keefer  employ  a number
of the same  variables  as Levine  and Renelt  including  average  annual  GDP  per capita,
average  annual  investment  as a percentage  of GDP, and average  annual  government
consumption  as a percentage  of GDP, all measured  over the period 1974-89.
24and because  the benefits  of these interventions  appear  to operate at least  with a two to
three year lag, the potential  sample  is cut dramatically.  The small  sample,  in turn, makes
the estimation  quite sensitive  to outliers. All  that said, with minor  corrections  for outliers,
the available  data tell a consistent  story across  alternative  model  specifications.  However,
given  so few degrees  of freedom,  the findings  should,  perhaps,  be viewed  with a healthy
dose of skepticism.  At the least, it should  be emphasized  that the modeling  effort  is a work
in progress  that will be refined  as additional  Bank  projects in the financial  sector mature.
As  the summary  statistics  indicated,  initial  financial  sector and macroeconomic
conditions  had implications  for the success  of an intervention.  Model (1) essentially  re-
states what we know  from Table  2.3 -- countries  that had relatively  under-developed
financial  systems  and low inflation  experienced  the largest  post-intervention  improvements
as measured  by M2/GDP. 33 The limitations  of the dependent  variable  should  be
emphasized.  Ideally,  one would  like  to measure  the post-intervention  health  of the
banking  sector and, perhaps,  the efficiency  of capital  allocation. While  financial  deepening
may  often coincide  with improved  health  and efficiency,  this need not always  be the case.
For example,  in Tanzania  there was much  post-intervention  financial  deepening  but, given
the lack of serious  institutional  reform  in the banking  sector, it is quite  unlikely  that it
33  The result also holds for improvements  in DBPC/GDP,  although  it is less  robust
across  alternative  specifications.  In general,  the DBPC/GDP  results are more fragile  than
those for M2/GDP. The trade variables,  in particular,  perform  poorly  in the DBPC/GDP
regressions. The overall  fit of those regressions,  moreover,  fluctuates  wildly  across
alternative  specifications,  and never approaches  that of the M2/GDP  regressions. This  is
somewhat  troubling  because,  on an a priori basis, it is difficult  to argue  that the M2 data
should  be any more reliable  than the DBPC data as both come  from the same  source. In
any  event,  we present  only the M2/GDP  results.
25coincided  with improved  capital  allocation  or healthier  banks (See discussion  in Section
IV).
The "group" explanatory  variables  in the regression  tables  are dummies  that
correspond  to the country  groups  described  in Table  2.3. The omitted  category  is group
IV, countries  that had relatively  developed  financial  sectors  and high  inflation  in the two
years  leading  up to the intervention.  The coefficient  on group I, therefore,  indicates  that
low-development,  low-inflation  countries  experienced,  on average,  M2/GDP  increases  7.5
points higher  than  did group IV countries. As is evident  in the tables,  the group I
coefficient  is statistically  significant  across  a wide array of alternative  specifications. For
the intermediate  countries  (low-development,  high inflation  or high-development,  low-
inflation),  the coefficients  are positive,  though less  pronounced. When  OED  reform  area
dununy  variables  are included  (Tables  3.2 and 3.3), the group II and m coefficients
become  positive  in some  specifications.
One  might suspect  that the results  in Table  3.1 are sensitive  to the way the country
dummies  were derived. To mimic  these results  using continuous  variables,  we replace  the
group dummies  with an interaction  variable  that multiplies  DBPC/GDP  by inflation
(Model  2).  The coefficient  on the interaction  term enters negatively  and significantly,  as
expected. When DBPC/GDP  and inflation  enter the model  additively,  DBPC/GDP
provides  most of the explanatory  power; as predicted,  it enters  negatively  and significantly
across specifications  (See Figure I for a visual  display  of these  results). However,  overall
26fit and robustness  of results  are best when the two variables  enter multiplicatively,  or when
the two are used to construct  the group dummies. When  per capita GDP replaces
DBPC/GDP  in the specification  (entering  either  on its own or as a part of the interaction
term), the results  are substantially  similar  to those  presented. That is, its coefficient's  sign
is negative  and significant  in most specifications. 34 The result provides  support  for the
notion that, given  the strong  ties between  the real and financial  sectors emphasized  by
Gertler  and Rose, conditional  convergence  is, to some extent,  reflected  in financial  sector
development.
It should  be emphasized  that both Models (1) and (2) are sensitive  to the presence
of outliers. In these models  and all those  that follow,  M2/GDP  improvements  more  than
two standard  deviations  away  from the sample  mean were eliminated.  In the first two
specifications,  this meant  eliminating  only  the Nicaraguan  observation  from the analysis.
When  Nicaragua  was included,  the coefficients  on most variables  flipped  and the adjusted
R-squared  of the regression  sank  to nearly  zero. Specifications  (3) through  (20) extend
the "two standard  deviations"  correction  to all continuous  variables  used in the model.
'hile many  of the regression  results  are not overly  sensitive  to the outlier  corrections  on
the continuous  explanatory  variables,  they are slightly  more robust when  we apply  the
correction  across  the board. In most cases,  moreover,  a continuous  variable  value two
standard  deviations  away  from the sample  mean is a strong indication  that something  was
especially  amiss  at the time of the intervention,  or that there were potentially  serious
.14  Calculations  available  from the author.
27measurement  problems  in the data. Similar  regression  results for the full sample  -- except
Nicaragua  -- appear  in Appendix  9 (See Figure  2 for a visual  display  of the sample,  and
the key reforms  covered  by each  intervention). 35 The only  important  difference  is that
results  regarding  trade (IMP/GDP)  no longer hold.
Table  3.1
Post-Intervention lhange  in M2/GDP, Regression  Results
Explanatory  Macro  +  Macro  +  Macro  +  Macro  +
Variable  Financial  Financial  + Trade  Financial  + Trade  Financial  + Trade
+ Institutions  + Intervention
Type
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Constant  -2.29  3.04  -11.91  4.88  -5.60  -4.68  -9.92  -5.81
(1.16)  (2.48)  (1.78)  (1.37)  (0.58)  (1.03)  (1.41)  (1.20)
Group  1  7.49  8.20  5.56  6.81
(2.93)  (2.04)  (1.12)  (1.79)
Group  II  3.82  4.96  3.08  1.02
(1.44)  (1.15)  (0.63)  (0.23)
Group  m  1.55  4.23  1.16  1.87
(0.62)  (0.97)  (0.21)  (0.44)
DBPC/GDPx  Infl.  -.0029  -.0053  -.0041  -.0052
(2.10)  (1.98)  (0.88)  (1.86)
IMP/GDP  0.35  0.38  0.39  0.42  0.32  0.39
(2.11)  (2.60)  (1.98)  (2.09)  (2.04)  (2.62)
ICRG  -0.19  -0.07
(0.99)  (0.28)
FSAL  Dummy  4.24  2.46
(1.65)  (0.97)
Reforms  Covered  -0.23  -0.11
(0.37)  (0.16)
Adj. R-Squared  .274  .146  .374  .330  .357  .272  .458  .301
Number  of  22  21  16  16  15  15  16  16
Observations
Note: t-statistics  in parentheses;  group dummies  defined  in Table  2.2.
35  Nicaragua  experienced  the largest  post-loan  increases  in M2/GDP  in the sample
(15.7%). As noted, the inclusion  of the Nicaragua  observation  presents  serious  problems.
This is likely  due to measurement  problems  -- Nicaraguan  inflation  averaged  over 1400%
in the two years prior to the FSAL and over 30% in the two years  subsequent  to it. In
addition,  real GDP remained  largely  flat in the years  immediately  subsequent  to the loan,
and had still  failed  to reach its mid-80s  levels  three years  after the loan. The increase  in
M2/GDP,  therefore,  was less reflective  of true financial  deepening  than it would have  been
if GDP had been growing  at a reasonable  pace.
28Across all specifications in which it was included for the small sample, openness to
trade as measured by IMIP/GDP  had a significant  positive coefficient.  On average, each I
point increase in IMP/GDP implied a .4 point increase in M2/GDP three years after
intervention. This would appear to confirm the notion that (1) open economies grow
faster than others and (2) this growth is reflected in a larger financial sector.  There are,
however, some potential flies in the ointment. First, the results cannot be re-produced
when EXP/GDP replaces IMP/GDP in the specification. In fact, although the coefficient
for EXP/GDP never achieves significance,  the sign is negative in some specifications. As
Levine and Renelt point out, the link between growth and openness is robust across
numerous indicators of trade, not just imports. For this sample, however, imports may be
a more accurate indicator of openness to trade than exports.  In the case of Venezuela, for
example, their relatively high EXP/GDP figure (36.5%) is probably more indicative of
their vast oil reserves than of a general openness to trade.  Their relatively low IMP/GDP
figure (15.3%) is, therefore, a better gauge of their inclination toward trade.  By contrast,
for the other countries in the sample, IMP/GDP exceeded EXP/GDP, which appears to be
common across many developing countries.
A second problem with the trade results is that they cannot be extended to the full
sample. 36 That is, when all observations (except Nicaragua) are included in the
regressions, the coefficient on IMP/GDP is generally positive, but small and not
significantly  different from zero.  In addition, when the Summers-Heston measure of
36  See Appendix 9, models 29-35.
29openness  (imports  plus exports,  divided  by GDP) replaces  IMP/GDP  in the regressions,  its
coefficient  is negative  and significant  across  a number  of specifications.  Perhaps,  similar
to the results  for initial  deposit  bank credit  to the private sector (DBPC/GDP),  those
countries  that are already  relatively  open to trade at the time of an intervention  have  less
t'room  to grow" in terms of financial  depth.
Another  problem  emphasized  by Levine  and Renelt  is theoretical. A potential
rationale  for the IMP/GDP  result is that international  trade permits  specialization  which,  in
turn, improves  resource  allocation  (and thus  fosters  growth). As noted, however,
openness  is highly  correlated  with investment  as a percentage  of GDP. When both
openness  and investment  measures  are included  in growth  regressions,  therefore,  openness
loses  substantial  explanatory  power. This suggests  that openness  contributes  to growth
through  increased  capital  accumulation  rather improved  resource  allocation. For our
purposes,  of course,  it may  not matter exactly  how openness  contributes  to growth -- to
the extent  that it does, we simply  expect  a larger  financial  sector. However,  both the lack
of theoretical  justification  and  the instability  of the openness  result with respect  to other
measures  of openness  are troubling. While  openness  may  have  implications  for the
success  of an intervention,  an ironclad  result  awaits  both additional  tests (either  as
additional  interventions  mature and data becomes  available,  or, perhaps,  using alternative
trade indicators)  and theoretical  advances.
30Regarding  institutional  explanatory  variables,  the results are mixed. Those that
attempt  to control  for institutional  quality  in the recipient  country  have  little explanatory
power  while  those that control  for institutional  features related  to the Bank  -- the type of
intervention,  the nature  of the reform  -- are far more successful.  Although  the BERI  and
ICRG variables have substantial explanatory power in growth regressions, the same is not
true here.3'  There are a number of possible explanations. The most plausible is that
DBPC/GDP and the indices are all measures of the security of property rights and thus are
highly correlated. 38 Clague et al, found a similar connection between contract intensive
money -- the ratio of non-currency money to the total money supply - and the security of
property rights. 39 Another explanation is that, for many of the countries in the sample,
BERI data (and, to a lesser extent, ICRG data) were not available in the year of the
intervention, which further limits an already small sample, and may make estimated
coefficients somewhat less reliable. Yet another is that growth regressions typically
include both industrialized and developing countries which often vary widely with respect
to these indicators.  Here, because we are restricted to Bank interventions (which tend to
occur in countries with relatively low institutional capacity), we lose variation and,
37  This is true regardless of whether the BERI and ICRG variables enter the
specification individually  or as part of indices. The ICRG results appear in Table 3.1,
models (5) and (6).  Also, some parts of the indices (such as the BERI measure of
expropriation risk) are, not surprisingly, highly co-linear with our initial conditions
variables, which further muddles the specification. For example, in this small sample of
developing countries, it appears that those that pose little expropriation risk to foreign
investors also have relatively stable macroeconomic situations, at least as measured by
inflation.
38  Indeed, the BERI index and initial DBPC/GDP are correlated at the .549 level.
however the ICRG-DBPC/GDP correlation is only .142.
39  Clague et al. (1994), pp. 16-18.
31therefore,  substantial  explanatory  power. 40 A final  potential  explanation  is that the BERI
and ICRG variables  do not sufficiently  capture  institutional  characteristics  that have
implications  for banking  performance. 4'  Better indicators  might  focus on the autonomy
and quality  of the central  bank or other proxies  for the quality  of bank supervision  (e.s
supervisors'  salaries). Unfortunately,  no cross-country  database  exists  that adequately
captures salient  institutional  features  of the banking  sector. 42 In short, that these broad
institutional  indices  do not perform  as expected  may  come as little  surprise  to many. The
inconclusive  results,  moreover,  speak  to a need  for more data on institutional  features  of
the banking  sector  if the impact  of interventions  is to be well  measured. 43
The institutional  variables  that described  the intervention  provided  substantially
more explanatory  power  than did  the BERI and ICRG  indices. The coefficient  for the
number  of reform  areas  covered  in the intervention  was negative  and  that for the FSAL
40  However,  ICRG/BERI  growth  results  are typically  robust  to sample  selection
(e.L. OECD  vs. non-OECD  countries). Of course, the regressions  here  employ  only a
small  subset  of non-OECD  countries.
41  Of course,  if the BERI and ICRG variables  are robustly  correlated  with growth,
and if the Gertler-Rose  hypothesis  is correct,  there should  be a positive  partial correlation
between  these indicators  and the size of the financial  sector. That we don't find  one
suggests  we have  either  measurement  problems  (as alluded  to above)  or, perhaps,  that
these indicators  are not exogenous,  and thus not truly correlated  with growth.
42  OED is, however,  striving  to create one. Unfortunately,  comparability  of data
across  countries  and a general  lack  of comprehensive  data collection  in many  countries
make this task especially  arduous.  Initial  collection  results  are positive  for some time series
on banking  indicators,  but the series  are not sufficiently  complete  for enough countries  to
permit  their inclusion  in the econometric  analysis. On central  bank independence,
Cukierman  and Webb  (1993)  also offer some  indicators.
43  Indeed,  this data could  also provide  us with more direct  ways  to measure  the
success  of an intervention  rather than analyzing  changes  in M2/GDP. For example,  data
on loan classification  or credit allocation  by sector may  tell us more about  the success  of
an effort  to reform  directed  credit or to privatize  banks than would  M2/GDP.
32dummy  was positive  (Table  3.1, Models 7, 8). Only  the FSAL dummy  coefficient
approached  significance.  However,  changes  in M2/GDP  were best explained  by the
dummy  variables  corresponding  to individual  reform  areas. In particular,  relative  to those
interventions  that did not attempt  bank privatizations,  those  that did performed  poorly.
The privatization  dummy  coefficient  was negative  (-3 to -4%), and significant.  The full
sample  results,  moreover,  indicate  that the most problematical  privatizations  were those
that did not also  focus on improved  prudential  regulations  (See Appendix  9, models  30
and 31). Those  that concentrated  on both were generally  a bit more successful  than  those
interventions  that did  not focus  on privatization  (although  the coefficient  was not
statistically  different  from  zero). By contrast,  those countries  that privatized  banks
without paying  attention  to prudential  regulations  did far worse - the coefficient  for
countries  in that group was negative,  large (in absolute  value),  and approached
significance.'
Privatizations  were, however,  the only reform  type from the ascending  group that
substantially  under-performed  other types of interventions.  In fact, the bank re-
capitalization  dummy  coefficient  indicates  that interventions  which  included  this  type of
reform  out-performed  others (Table  3.2, Models 13, 14).45  In absolute  value  this
coefficient  approaches  that for the privatization  dummy  and attains  the same  marginal
level  of statistical  significance.  However,  if one also includes  a dummy  indicating  whether
In Argentina,  where privatizations  coincided  with improvements  in prudential
regulations  and supervision,  banks' performance  was substantially  improved  after
privatization. See Clarke  and Cull  (1997).
45  See Appendix  9, models  32 and 33, for full sample  results.
33prior financial  sector interventions  in that country  had included  re-capitalization,  the
original  re-capitalization  variable  loses substantial  explanatory  power. In addition,  the
prior re-capitalization  dummy  has a negative  coefficient,  although  it is not statistically
significant  from zero. Apparently,  re-capitalizations  increase  moral  hazard  problems,
especially  when  they do not entail  high costs  to bank owners  and managers. After  all, why
protect capital  when  it is likely  to replenished  no matter how poorly  one manages  the
bank?
To test whether  re-capitalizations  were more  effective  when coupled  with reforms
designed  to alter  bankers' incentives,  we split  the re-capitalization  dummy  into two
variables  -- a dummy  for re-capitalizations  that included  prudential  regulation  reform,  and
another  for those  that did  not. The results  indicate  that those projects  that included  both
re-capitalization  and prudential  regulation  reform  were a bit more successful  than  those
that involved  re-capitalization  without  prudential  reform  (Appendix  8).  46 Although  the
coefficient  for projects  that involved  re-capitalization  only  was positive  (near  2), it was not
statistically  significant  from zero. These  reforms  were not, therefore,  obviously  more
successful  than those interventions  that did  not involve  re-capitalization.  The coefficient
for projects  that involved  both re-capitalization  and prudential  regulation  reform  was
46  Again,  see Appendix  9 for full sample  results. Like the small  sample  results  in
Appendix  8, the coefficient  for countries  that re-capitalized  and  tried to improve
prudential  regulations  was positive  and significantly  different  from zero. However,  the
coefficient  for those  that only  re-capitalized  is also positive  (and large),  although  its t-
statistic  is only 1.71. In short, the full sample  results  are less clear-cut  than  the small
sample  results  with respect to the beneficial  effect  of improved  prudential  regulations  on
re-capitalizations.
34larger (near  3), and approached  or achieved  significance  across  specifications.  It appears
that re-capitalizations  were, on average,  somewhat  more successful  than other types of
projects -- provided  some  attention  was paid  to the incentives  faced by bankers  in the
form of prudential  regulations. 4'
The bank supervision  dummy  variable  was also positive,  although  the coefficient
did not approach  significance  and was smaller  in absolute  value  than either  the
privatization  or the re-capitalization  variables. 48 On average,  interventions  that included
bank supervision  reform  performed  no better or worse than  those  that did not. 49 We again
split  the re-capitalization  dummy  into two variables,  one for those  that included
supervision  reform,  another  for those  that did  not. The results  were somewhat  similar  to
those for prudential  regulation  reform. That is, relative  to interventions  that did not
involve  bank re-capitalization,  those that addressed  both re-capitalization  and supervision
were, on average,  more successful.  Those  that addressed  only  re-capitalization  were
not. 50 Again,  it appears  that, given  sufficient  attention  to bank supervision  and prudential
regulations,  re-capitalizations  can be at least as successful  as other types  of financial  sector
operations  (See Figure  3 for a visual  depiction  of these results,  and those for
privatization).
47  Again,  one would  also like  to know if the health  and allocative  efficiency  of the
financial  sector improved  after re-capitalizations  that also focused  on improved  banking
regulations.
4S  See Appendix  9, models  34 and 35, for full sample  results.
49  Perhaps  little  reform  was actually  accomplished,  or a longer time lag is required
before supervision  reform  bears fruit.
50  The result  is somewhat  surprising  because,  as alluded  to above,  improving  bank
supervision  is typically  an arduous process that takes years  to pay off.
35Table  3.2
Post-Intervention Cbange in M2/GDP, Regression Results
Reforms in Ascending Group
Explanatory  Macro  +  Macro +  Macro +  Macro +
Variable  Financial +  Financial + Trade  Financial + Trade  Financial + Trade
Ascending  + Privatization  + Re-  + Supervision
Capitalization
(9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)
Constant  -11.00  -5.22  -14.10  -4.52  -9.76  -6.74  -13.80  -5.27
(1.66)  (2.34)  (1.35)  (1.57)  (1.86)  (2.18)  (1.39)
Group 1  7.38  8.94  5.51  9.37
(1.85)  (2.43)  (1.40)  (2.47)
Group  2  2.98  8.57  2.22  5.63
(0.66)  (1.95)  (0.53)  (1.40)
Group 3  2.44  6.75  1.25  4.79
(0.54)  (1.60)  (0.29)  (1.17)
DBPC/GDPx  Infl.  -.0051  -.0045  -.0040  -.0051
(1.83)  (1.79)  (1.48)  (1.82)
IMP/GDP  0.29  0.37  0.43  0.39  0.291  0.36  0.33  0.37
(1.67)  (2.44)  (2.74)  (2.83)  (1.86)  (2.60)  (2.09)  (2.42)
Ascending  3.99  0.83
(1.19)  (0.25)
Privatization  -4.18  -3.27
(1.82)  (1.67)
Re-Capitalization  3.20  2.80
(1.80)  (1.51)
Supervision  2.85  0.90
(1.66)  (0.46)
Adj. R-Squared  .398  .278  .482  .411  .480  .391  .460  .287
Number of  16  16  16  16  16  16  16  16
Observations
Note: t-statistics  in parentheses;  group dummies  defined  in Table  2.2.
Among  the three descending  reforms  (interest  rate distortions,  non-bank  financial
regulations,  and prudential  regulations),  only prudential  regulation  reforms  appear  to have
been substantially  more successful  than other  types of reforms. Relative  to other
interventions,  those that tackled  interest  rate distortions  were somewhat  better able  to
boost M2/GDP,  but the disparity  was not statistically  significant.  Similarly,  those
interventions  that dealt with  non-bank  financial  regulations  performed  somewhat  better
than those that did not, although  the result approached  significance  in Model  (21) but not
36in (22). The result's instability  suggests  that these interventions  did not perform
substantially  better  than those that did not address  non-bank  regulations. Among  all
reform  areas,  however,  the Bank's greatest  relative  successes  have occurred  with respect
to prudential  regulation  reform. The relatively  large positive  coefficient  on the prudential
dummy  (4-5%) and its statistical  significance  across  specifications  (Table  3.3, Models  23
and 24), suggest  that development  of the financial  sector has been linked  with World  Bank
intervention  in the regulatory  framework  that governs  banks in a recipient  country."
Bank  efforts  to strengthen  financial  institutions  do, therefore,  have  a positive  impact  on
project outcomes. As many  of these institution  building  efforts  are less  "visible"  than
other reforms  (bank  privatizations,  re-capitalizations,  interest  rate de-regulation),  this  may
be an important  area for Bank  involvement  when political  or macroeconomic  conditions
do not favor  bold steps.
51  The full sample  results (Appendix  9, model  29) are less pronounced  with respect
to prudential  regulations. However,  the importance  of prudential  regulations  is clear when
that variable  is interacted  with the re-capitalization  and privatization  variables  as discussed
above (models  31 and 33).
37Table 3.3
Post-Intervention Change in M2/GDP, Regression Results
Refonns in Descending Group
Explanatory  Macro +  Macro +  Macro +  Macro +
Variable  Financial +  Financial + Trade  Financial + Trade  Financial + Trade
Descending  + Interest Rate  + Non-Bank  + Prudential
Distortion  Financial  Regulations
Regulation
(17)  (18)  (19)  (201  (21)  (22)  (23)  (24)
Constant  -12.90  -7.52  -12.95  -6.65  -13.60  -4.88  -19.73  -8.34
(1.96)  (1.83)  (1.98)  (1.54)  (1.83)  (1.86)  (2.99)  (2.16)
Group 1  6.77  7.17  9.51  9.81
(1.66)  (1.81)  (2.03)  (2.83)
Group  2  3.09  2.66  5.89  5.86
(0.69)  (0.59)  (1.25)  (1.60)
Group 3  3.20  2.91  5.34  7.05
(0.74)  (0.67)  (1.10)  (1.81)
DBPC/GDPx  Infl.  -.0043  -.0049  -.0053  -.0050
(1.59)  (1.77)  (1.83)  (2.03)
IMP/GDP  0.34  0.37  0.38  0.41  0.40  0.38  0.44  0.39
(2.11)  (2.60)  (2.35)  (2.67)  (2.11)  (2.33)  (3.02)  (2.90)
Descending  4.00  3.91
(1.26)  (1.23)
Interest Rate  Dist.  2.61  1.50
(1.31)  (0.76)
Non-Bank  Fin.  3.20  .0089
Reg.  (1.80)  (.004)
Prudential  Reg.  4.74  3.72
(2.31)  (1.75)
Adj. R-Squared  .405  .356  .412  .411  .480  .275  .552  .422
Number of  16  16  16  16  16  16  16  16
Observations  _I  _IIII
Note: t-statistics in parentheses; group dununies defined in Table 2.2.
In many ways, the regression results merely help formalize notions suggested by
the summary statistics of the first two sections. For example, a relatively under-developed
financial sector and macroeconomic stability (as reflected in a low inflation rate) are both
associated with growth in M2/GDP.  Even after controlling for those factors, however,
there are systematic differences in the performance of interventions.  In particular,
relatively open economies appear to benefit more from financial sector interventions than
38do others. While  that result corresponds  nicely  with others  from the growth literature,  it
should  be re-emphasized  that it is not robust across  alternative  trade indicators.  5 2 Finally,
and most importantly,  after controlling  for inflation,  trade, and initial  financial  sector
development,  the nature  of the intervention  explains  substantial  variation  in outcomes. In
some  respects,  therefore,  the changing  nature  of financial  sector reforms  described  in
Section  I appears  to have  had a negative  effect  on performance,  at least  in a relative  sense.
Interventions  focused  on privatization  (a point of emphasis  in later projects),  have
performed  worse than others  (if only  in the three years subsequent  to the loan). In
addition,  FSALs  appear  to have  out-performed  other interventions;  and those
interventions  focused  on prudential  regulations  have  performed  better than others. The
results  also have  been encouraging  for re-capitalizations,  especially  those that have  also
focused  on prudential  regulation  reform  and/or bank supervision.  Intriguing  though they
may  be, these are, of course, only  partial  correlations  derived  from a very  limited  data set.
As additional  data becomes  available,  the correlations  may  become  more robust. Reliable
or not, however,  correlations  do not necessarily  imply  causation. Understanding  whether
and why  open economies  tend to outperform  others, or why  FSALs  tended  to out-perform
non-FSALs  (at least  this for this sample),  or why  privatizations  have gone relatively
poorly, requires  details  that our regressions  cannot  easily  provide. In an effort  to uncover
52  Nor is it robust to inclusion  of those observations  for which  DBPC/GDP,  inflation,
or IMP/GDP  were more than  two standard  deviations  away  from the sample  mean. While
some of these observations  are likely  subject  to measurement  error - especially  those for
countries  that experienced  especially  high inflation  -- it is troublesome  that the IMP/GDP
result does not hold up for all twenty-two  potential  observations  in the sample. By
contrast,  the results  for initial  conditions  and the relative  effectiveness  of individual
reforms  hold up across all observations  (except  Nicaragua). Again,  results  for the twenty-
two observation  sample  appear  in Appendix  9.
39some of those details,  we use the regression  results to help  select  specific  cases which  we
analyze  in the next  section.
IV. Case Studies of Financial Sector Interventions
(A). Philippines
Countries  with financial  sectors  that were substantially  similar  at the time of the
intervention  experienced  very different  improvements  in M2/GDP. For example,  deposit
bank credit  as a percentage  of GDP was roughly  17%  in both the Philippines  and
Venezuela  at the time of the intervention.  The interventions  occurred  at roughly  the same
time (Philippines  1989,  Venezuela  1990);  both were relatively  comprehensive  FSALs
covering  six reform  areas. Three years  after  the intervention,  however,  M21GDP  had
increased  by 5.61 points  in the Philippines  while  it had declined  by 4.14 points  in
Venezuela. What  explains  the wide disparity?  No doubt, a large  part of the Philippine
success  can be traced to favorable  initial  conditions  -- the banking  sector  was relatively
under-developed,  average  inflation  in the two years  prior to intervention  was relatively
low  (10.47%),  and, relative  to many  other developing  countries,  the Philippines  was open
to international  trade (IMP/GDP  was 26.3%). Indeed,  these are the ideal initial  conditions
for reform  as identified  by the models  in the previous  section. It is little  surprise,
therefore,  that the model  predicted  a 4.77 point increase  in M2/GDP. 53
53  The predictions  in this section  are derived  from model  (24).
40Yet, these favorable  initial  conditions  did not arrive out of thin air. Some were the
product of comprehensive  economic  reform  that began  in the early 1  980s including
exchange  rate flexibility  and  removal  of agricultural  price distortions. 54 Substantial  trade
liberalization  was achieved  under  a 1986  IMIF  agreement  and, to further  improve  the real
sector, the Bank undertook  an Industrial  Restructuring  Project  Loan  just subsequent  to
the FSAL. 55 In addition,  although  the results  were yet to be reflected  in higher  M2/GDP,
substantial  reform  had been  undertaken  in the financial  sector: in the early  '80s, interest
rates had been  de-regulated,  bank capital  reserve  requirements  had been  increased,  and
universal  banking  was introduced. 56 In 1986-7,  the two largest  government  financial
institutions  were restructured  with  Bank support and, in subsequent  years,  treasury  bill
auctions  began, and preliminary  steps were taken to improve  supervision  of securities
markets institutions.57  Although  it is difficult  to ascertain  precisely  which  of these reforms
were necessary  for the success  of the FSAL, it is also difficult  to quibble  with the Bank's
assessment  that policy  lending  operations  had "led to an environment  conducive  to
concentrate  on the reforms  of the financial  system." 5"
Despite  the progress  that had been made,  a 1987  study identified  four remaining
major problems  in the financial  sector: bank supervision,  protection  of depositors,
54  World Bank,  "Philippines  FSAL: Performance  Audit  Report (PAR),"  June 28,
1996,  pp. 9, 17.
55  World Bank,  "Philippines  FSAL: Project Completion  Report (PCR),"  June 16,
1995, p. 6.
56  Ibid., pp. 5-6.
57'  PAR, p. 9.
5S  PCR, p. 7.
41lowering  intermediation  costs, and delivery  of long-term  credit. On supervision,  the loan
specified  that the Central  Banking  Act be amended  to include  guidelines  for emergency
loans  to banks  in distress,  transparent  criteria  for issuing  cease  and desist  orders,  new rules
for lending  to bank insiders,  and  liability  insurance  for central  bank staff.5 With respect  to
deposit  insurance,  the Philippines  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  (PDIC)  increased  its fee
structure  and increased  its capital  by three billion  pesos (US$ 115  million). Intermediation
costs remained  high  despite  reduced  taxes on intermediaries,  fewer  restrictions  on foreign
bank entry,  and  the elimination  of branching  restrictions. 60 It is unlikely,  however,  that
these developments  had substantial  impact  on the increase  in M2 three years  after the
intervention  -- most of PDIC's capital  increase  was scheduled  for 1991-2  and arrived
late, 61 legislation  liberalizing  foreign  bank entry  was passed  in 1994,  and, although  148
new branches  were  allowed to be established  in 1990-91,  it is unclear  how  many  were
actually  in operation  in those  years. 62 Finally,  with  respect  to delivery  of long-term  credit,
directed  credit  schemes  were transferred  from government  ministries  to the Development
Bank of Philippines  (DBP),  which  was then scheduled  to be privatized  four years  hence.
Once  again,  it seems  unlikely  that this gradual  change  was responsible  for any of the
increase  in M2 three years  after  the FSAL,  although  it may have  contributed  to subsequent
increases.
S9.  PAR, p. 10.
60  PAR, p. 1O. PCR, p. 22. World  Bank,  "Philippines  FSAL: President's  Report
(PR)," April  6, 1989, p. 24.
61  PCR, p. 10, 32.
62  Of course,  the mere threat of entry  may  change  the behavior  of incumbents.  I
assume,  therefore,  that the disciplinary  effect  of the announced  entrants  was not primarily
responsible  for the post-FSAL  financial  deepening.
42Although  some  of the required  legislation  was difficult  to pass. and thus made
cancellation  of the second  tranche of the loan  a possibility, 63 the Bank  viewed  the
Philippine  FSAL a success  owing,  in part, to the high  priority  and ownership  of the
program  by the Government.64  That success,  moreover,  was achieved  despite  exogenous
shocks  -- an '89 coup attempt, a '90 earthquake,  and  a volcano  eruption  in '91.
Interestingly,  the Bank  pointed  to the increase  in financial  deepening  (as measured  by
M2/GDP)  as an indication  that the FSAL  had  been a success.  65  As  noted, however,  it
appears  quite  unlikely  that a FSAL  focused  exclusively  on institutional  developments  in
the financial  sector  that all took a relatively  long  time to implement  was responsible  for
this improvement.  More likely  candidates  were the reforms  undertaken  during  the '80s,
especially  those that contributed  to macro-stabilization  and openness  to trade (if our
models  are to be believed). 66 The Bank drew the following  from the Philippine
experience:
A  FSAL  focusing  on institutional  strengthening  has a better chance  to succeed
when the economy  has reached  a significant  level  of trade and financial  sector
liberalization. 67
In this instance,  it appears  probable  that the Bank  erroneously  attributed  to the FSAL
financial  sector deepening  that was a natural  by-product  of trade liberalization,  macro-
stability,  and more basic  financial  sector reforms. This is not to argue that this narrowly-
63  Ibid., p. 10.
Ibid, p. 16.
65  PAR, p. 10.
66  The Bank was also quick  to note that macro-economic  stability  was necessary  for
the success  of financial  reform. PAR, p. 27.
67  Ibid., p. 27.
43tailored  FSAL  didn't have  its merits,  but rather  that any  positive  effects  were likely  to be
felt later on, and were probably  unlikely  to be reflected  in dramatic  jumps in M2.
(B). Venezuela
The case  of Venezuela  further  underscores  the primacy  of reforms  that focus  on
trade liberalization  and macro-stability.  As noted above,  at the time of its intervention,
Venezuela's  financial  sector was at a stage  of development  similar  to that of the
Philippines.  Venezuela,  however,  had not undergone  reform  sufficient  to instill  macro
stability  nor openness  to trade -- in the two years  prior to intervention  inflation  averaged
62.7%;  in the intervention  year, imports  were only 15.3%  of GDP. Largely  due to these
two factors,  the model  predicted  that Venezuela's  M2/ GDP  would  undergo  a 3.84 point
contraction in the wake  of the intervention.  In fact, a 4.14 point contraction  occurred.
These  were not, however,  the only  two respects  in which  the two countries
differed,  as the Philippines  was also somewhat  further  along  the road to sustainable
financial  sector reform  in some  key areas. Although  the Venezuelan  FSAL  was a part of a
comprehensive  reform  program,  and although  progress  had  been made on a number  of
issues  including  exchange  rate unification,  deficit  reduction,  reduced  protectionism,
interest  rate liberalization,  and the transformation  of indirect  subsidies  into focused  social
programs,  a bit more had probably  been  accomplished  in the Philippine  case. 63 In the
President's  Report  (PR) that accompanied  the Venezuelan  FSAL,  the Bank  identified
fundamental  financial  sector reforms  yet to be achieved: fiurther  interest  rate liberalization,
63  Venezuela  PCR, March 14, 1995,  p. 3.
44the elimination  of agricultural  credit  requirements  for commercial  banks,  the privatization
of a number  of public  banks,  less Central  Bank  involvement  in the private credit  market,
the strengthening  of weak financial  intermediaries  through  fewer operational  restrictions,
and, finally,  the strengthening  of intermediary  competition  through  additional  entry and the
aforementioned  privatizations. 69 Much of the list looks similar  to the remaining  problems
in the Philippines  at the time of the intervention  -- directed  credit,  a clearer  role for the
Central  Bank,  too many  restrictions  on intermediaries,  and little intermediary  competition.
The important  differences  in the Venezuelan  case  were the inclusion  of further  interest  rate
liberalization  and the privatization  of some  public  banks. In the Philippine  case, interest
rates were liberalized  prior to the FSAL  in an economic  environment  substantially  less
inflationary  than Venezuela's,  and major  public  financial  institutions  had already  been
substantially  re-structured  with an eye toward  their eventual  privatization. 70
These  differences  proved important. In its Performance  Audit  Report,  the Bank
rated the Venezuela  project  unsatisfactory,  its sustainability  uncertain,  and its institutional
development  modest. 7'  The key reason was that interest  rates were liberalized  in an
unstable  macro-environment,  which  led to wide rate swings  and, eventually,
disintermediation. 72 Citing  the Bank's "Report  of the Task Force on Financial  Sector
69  Venezuela  PR, May  21, 1990,  p. 23. Venezuela  PAR, June 30, 1995,  p. 21.
70  It is striking  that neither  improved  supervision  nor strengthened  prudential
regulations  were mentioned  as important  remaining  problems  in Venezuela,  a country
where  financial  sector reform  was in its infancy  at the time of the FSAL.
71  PAR, pp. 12-13.
72  In addition,  at time of the liberalization,  many  banks were probably  insolvent.
With no improvements  in supervision,  these bankers  were unlikely  to exhibit  the prudent
behavior  that fosters  financial  deepening.
45Operations,"  the PAR indicated  that these  effects  could have  been  avoided  had the Bank's
best practice  been  followed:
We must be mindful  that the liberalization  of financial  markets,  even  more than in
other  sectors,  can be dangerously  destabilizing,  unless  the preconditions  for
efficient,  competitive  market  operation  are in place.' 3
The PAR concluded  that macroeconomic  stability  was among  the more  obvious  of these
preconditions." 4 To have  privatized  public  banks during  this unstable  period probably
compounded  Venezuela's  problems:  if the regressions  are any guide,  even  after
controlling  for macroeconomic  instability,  the Bank  has, on average,  had less  luck  with
bank privatizations  than  other  reforms. Interestingly,  the PAR  gave the Government
passing  marks  for privatizing  four of the nine  commercial  banks  that it owned  and
liquidating  an agricultural  credit  institution. However,  the PAR also  noted that in mid-
January  1994,  the second  largest  bank in the country  stopped  operations  and seven  other
banks became  unable  to continue  operating  without  large cash infusions  from the Central
Bank. 75 Rather  than assume  a more forceful  role,  the Central  Bank  continued  to provide
liquidity  to these seven  for months  until  they,  too, proved  insolvent  (at which  point  the
Government  took them  over). While  it is unclear  from  the PAR whether  any  of the newly
privatized  banks  were among  the seven  insolvencies,  it nevertheless  may have  been
unwise,  in retrospect,  to have  privatized  banks in such a turbulent  environment.
73  World  Bank, R89-163,  August 1, 1989. The Bank's Development  Economics  and
Chief  Economist  Office  (DEC)  had also criticized  this loan  ex ante, arguing  that interest
rate de-regulation  with insolvent  institutions  subject  to poor supervision  and insufficient
prudential  regulations  was a bad recipe.
74  The PAR does, however,  point out that it was not until February,  1992  that the
Bank  issued  new Operational  directives  that emphasized  caution  in financial  liberalization
in the face of macroeconomnic  instability  or sharp changes  in relative  prices. PAR,  p. 30.
75  PAR,  p. 20.
46It is interesting  to note that, like  the Philippines,  Venezuela  underwent  a number  of
exogenous  shocks  just subsequent  to the FSAL  --  oil revenues  plummeted  to their pre-
Gulf  War levels  in 1991,  and  there was an attempted  coup and a collapse  of the Caracas
Stock  Exchange  in 1992. Although  these shocks  (especially  the collapse  of the stock
exchange)  were, perhaps,  more  intimately  related  to the banking  sector  than those in the
Philippines,  Philippine  financial  sector development  continued  unabated. It would  not,
therefore,  appear  to be appropriate  to ascribe  the difference  in the performance  between
the two cases  largely  to exogenous  shocks. Instead,  it appears  that the root cause  of the
Venezuelan  debacle  stemmed  from  the sequencing  of reforms. 76 As  the PAR emphasized,
very little  good can come from  interest  rate liberalization  in an unstable  macroeconomic
environment,  especially  when banks  are insolvent,  supervision  lax, and prudential
regulations  inadequate." Releasing  the third tranche  of the loan  when  macroeconomic
conditions  had not substantially  improved,  moreover,  may  also have  been  unwise. 7S  As
the regression  models  and  the Philippine  case  indicate,  the earliest  reform  efforts  may  have
been  best concentrated  on achieving  macro-stability.  Similarly,  the Venezuelan
Government  may have  been  better served  by opening  its markets  a bit more  to
international  trade in the earliest  stages  of reform. While  the bank privatizations  were not
76  It should  also be noted that institutional  strengthening  (especially  with regard to
bank supervision)  occurred  at a slower  pace than either  the Bank  or the Venezuelan
Government  envisioned  due to the Venezuelan  Congress's  rejection  of a technical
assistance  component  that accompanied  the FSAL. It is unlikely,  however,  that the
world's finest  bank supervisors  could have  ameliorated  the problems  arising  from
liberalizing  interest rates in an unstable  macroeconomic  environment.  PAR, pp. 22-23.
77  PAR, pp. 11-12, 14, 23.
7S  The PAR makes  the same  point, p. 14.
47at the root of these problems,  it is obvious  that they did little  to help  resolve  them. No
doubt, it would  have been  much  easier  for the privatized  banks had they emerged  to a
stable  macro  environment  and a healthier  real sector  which  was increasingly  predicated  on
international  trade.
Based on the foregoing,  it is difficult  to conclude  whether  the institutional
strengthening  components  of FSALs  contributed  to financial  deepening  in and of
themselves. In the Philippine  case,  for example,  one could  conclude  that the FSAL  was a
lagging  indicator,  a reflection  that prior reforms  had crystallized  to a point  were the Bank
felt it appropriate  to devote  an entire  project  to financial  sector adjustment. The post-
FSAL  increase  in M2, therefore,  was more  appropriately  attributed  to prior reforms,
especially  those that spurred  openness  or macro-stability.  In short, the institutional
strengthening  component  of this particular  FSAL  may  have  had little  independent  impact
on development  of the Philippine  financial  sector. 79 The Venezuelan  case  further
underscores  the primacy  of reforms  based  on trade liberalization  and  macroeconomic
stability  in deepening  the financial  sector. Although  one institutional  feature of that FSAL
-- namely,  bank privatizations  -- may  have  contributed  negatively  to the project's
outcome,  the root causes  of the failure  appear  not to have  been  institutional.  In an effort
to highlight  the extent to which  institutional  components  of FSALs  have  exerted an
independent  force on financial  deepening,  we turn to the cases  of Pakistan  and Tanzania.
79  However, some  institutional  strengthening  may  have  been so crucial  that it had to
occur prior to the FSAL. The loan,  therefore,  may  have  been an ex post reward for the
institutional  reform  that had already  taken place. Indeed,  in the three years  prior to the
FSAL, M2/GDP  went from  26.7% to 32.4%.
48(C). Pakistan
From the perspective  of the models  in the previous  section,  Pakistan's  initial
conditions  were less  than promising. Although  inflation  was moderate  in the two years
prior to the FSAL  (averaging  8.4%),  the private  banking  sector was better developed  than
in most of the countries  in the sample  (DBPC/GDP  was 25.4%).  The interaction  term
used in many  of the models  (DBPC/GDP  * inflation)  was, therefore,  among  the larger
ones in the sample.8 0 In addition,  Pakistan's  openness  to international  trade was below  the
sample  average  (IMP/GDP  was 19.0%). Largely  because  of these factors,  the model
predicted  only  a modest  increase  in M2/GDP  (1.8 points)  in the wake  of the FSAL. The
Bank  also recognized  that initial  conditions  had an adverse  effect  on the loan  noting that,
"without  significant  improvements  on the stabilization  front,  the benefits  of the reforms
have been much reduced."8'  Although the Bank was concerned primarily with the
negative  effects  of inflation  and the large  fiscal  deficit,  a lack  of trade openness  and an
already substantially developed (if highly imperfect) private banking system also probably
exacted  a toll on the rate of financial  deepening.
According to the Bank's Project Completion Report, the saving grace of the
Pakistan  FSAL was the success  of a number  of reforms  aimed  at strengthening  financial
institutions. Prior to the FSAL, a number  of foreign  private  banks received  licenses,  the
so  Its large DBPC/GDP  figure,  moreover,  moved  Pakistan  into Group HI (high
financial development, low inflation countries).  The models and summary statistics
indicated that Group III countries were among the worst performers in terms of post-
intervention  financial  deepening.
91  Pakistan: PCR, March 16, 1995, p. iii.
49capital  base of nationalized  commercial  banks (NCB)  was strengthened,  directed  credit
was limited,  and interest  rates  were largely  liberalized." 2 In 1988,  the Government  of
Pakistan  formulated  a Financial  Sector  Adjustment  Program  to tackle remaining  problems.
That program  highlighted  six main  areas  for future reform: (1) macroeconomic
stabilization  to be achieved  by reducing  the fiscal  deficit  and controlling  monetary
aggregates,  (2) more  efficient  issuance  of Government  debt, (3) more market-based  credit
allocation  (through  raising  concessional  rates of interest  and limiting  directed  credit
schemes),  (4) further  re-capitalization  and restructure  of nationalized  commercial  banks,
(5) improvement  in prudential  regulations  and supervision  governing  all financial
institutions,  and (6) promoting  the entry of additional  private  banks. While  this list may
look eerily  similar  to that for both the Philippines  and Venezuela,  the PCR suggests  that
Pakistan  was somewhat  more successful  in implementing  the reforms. Of course, PCRs
are sometimes  more optimistic  than Bank  audits  (PARs),  and the PAR for Pakistan  is yet
to be completed. In any event,  the PCR indicates  that the Government  introduced
auctions  for its debt, converted  much  of that debt into longer  terms, kept directed  credit
within  limits  agreed  to by the Bank,  began  supervising  non-bank  financial  intermediaries,
and established  a credit  bureau  and banking  courts. It also conducted  audits  of NCBs,
saw to it that they achieved  the requisite  capital  adequacy  ratio, and then  scrapped  its plan
to restructure  them  in favor  of privatization,  which  it began doing  in 1991."
82  PCR, pp. 2-3.
83  PCR, pp. 6-1  1. As noted, however,  the pace of bank privatization  subsequently
proved disappointing.
50Given  Pakistan's  apparent  commitment  to institutional  reform,  it is no surprise  that
the Bank  considered  that FSAL a success,  at least at the PCR stage. The project was
rated satisfactory,  its outcomes  sustainable,  and the resulting  institutional  development
substantial.8 4 The PCR, moreover,  viewed  these positive  institutional  developments  as
"remarkable  in light  of the disappointing  macroeconomic  results,"" 5 noting  that the
Pakistani  Government  had  taken reform  further  than the FSAL  had envisaged  with respect
to commercial  bank restructuring  and competition  from new private  financial  institutions. 86
Although  the Bank  claimed  little  financial  deepening  after  the FSAL,  the IFS data did
indicate  a moderate  increase  in M2/GDP  (+2.5%,  three years  after the loan). At the least,
the disintermediation  of the pre-FSAL  period  appeared  to have  been reversed.8 7 In short,
Pakistan's  experience  suggests  that minor  progress  can be made  towards financial
deepening  in environments  where  the initial  conditions  are found  wanting  (as viewed  by
both the Bank  and the models  of the previous  section). Again,  however,  absent a full
audit,  it remains  a bit unclear  whether  these institutional  reforms  are sustainable.  If not,
the meager  financial  deepening  that was achieved  may  be reversed.
(D).  Tanzania
On the other hand,  Tanzania  makes  it clear that, in countries  with relatively
favorable  initial  conditions,  post-FSAL  financial  deepening  may  occur despite  the failure
of the institutional  reform  program. In two respects,  Tanzania  conformed  to the model's
84  PCR,  Cover memo.
S5  PCR,  p. 12.
86  PCR, p. 5.
87  PCR,  p. iv.
51ideal initial  conditions  for substantial  post-intervention  deepening  -- its openness  to trade
(ISP/GDP was 36.3%) and its under-developed  financial  sector (DBPC/GDP  stood at
16.3%). In another  respect,  Tanzania  was less  than  ideal:  its thirty percent  inflation  rate
implied  an instability  that should  have discouraged  financial  intermediation.  Because
subsequent  inflation  proved  to be both lower and  predictable  (in  the 20-25%  range),
however,  it did little  to forestall financial  deepening.  Largely  on the basis  of its trade
openness  and under-developed  banking  sector,  the model  predicted  a seven  point  increase
in M2/GDP. The actual  figure  proved  to be almost  nine,  although,  as we discuss  below,
the particular  brand  of deepening  was not necessarily  extolled  by the Bank.
As in the other cases,  Tanzania's  FSAL  was part of a larger  reform  effort,  and its
focus  was developed  from a financial  sector development  report undertaken  by the
Government.  In 1986,  the Government  introduced  its Economic  Recovery  Program
(ERP)  to improve  macroeconomic  management,  tackle underlying  structural  weaknesses,
and encourage  a more  vibrant  private  sector. Specific  ERP reforms  included  a substantial
depreciation  of the overvalued  exchange  rate, trade liberalization,  the removal  of most
price controls,  and the easing  of restrictions  on the marketing  of food crops. The reform
effort helped  spur economic  growth  -- the average  annual  growth rate in GDP was 4%
from 1986-91  . Against  this backdrop  of successful  reform,  a Presidential  Banking
Commission  Report was undertaken  to chart a course  for institutional  strengthening  in the
financial  sector. That report identified  a four-pronged  approach  to financial  reform
It  Tanzania: PCR, August 10, 1995,  pp. 1-2.
52including:  (1) creating  a stable  macroeconomic  framework,  including  indirect  methods  of
monetary  control,  (2) financial  infrastructure  strengthening  including  revision  of banking
and associated  legislation,  introduction  of banking  supervision  functions  at the Bank  of
Tanzania,  and a review  of the accounting  and auditing  framework,  (3) creating  a more
competitive  banking  enviromnent  through  increased  private  participation,  and (4) the
restructuring  and re-capitalization  of existing  banks including  the creation  of a trust for the
collection  and liquidation  of non-performing  assets in the banking  system.
Again  we see  the usual  litany  -- macro  stabilization,  prudential  regulations  and
supervision,  increased  competition  through  entry,  restructuring  and re-capitalization.
Unlike  Pakistan,  however,  the results  for Tanzania  in these areas were either  mixed  or
disappointing.  Indirect  monetary  control  was achieved  in part through  the introduction  of
treasury bill  auctions,  although  an expansive  monetary  policy  contributed  to inflation  that
kept interest  rates high (both  nominal  and real). Bank supervision  may  have  improved  due
to new prudential  regulations,  but Bank  of Tanzania  staff  lacked  the skills  necessary  to
exercise  new enforcement  powers. Two new banks began operations  in 1993,  although
the restructuring  plan  for the National  Bank  of Commerce  appeared  largely  ineffective.
Finally,  although  government  owned  financial  institutions  were re-capitalized  and
significant  portions  of their non-performing  assets were transferred  to the liquidation  trust,
the banks  were still insolvent  and incurring  substantial  losses in the years  after the
intervention. 89 It was little  wonder,  therefore,  that the Bank  rated the project
S9  PCR, pp.  10-11.
53unsatisfactory,  its institutional  development  negligible,  and its meager  achievements
unsustainable.
Surprisingly,  from the perspective  of financial  deepening,  the years  just subsequent
to the FSAL  were less  disappointing  than  the Bank's assessment  might  lead  one to believe.
As noted, M2/GDP  had increased  by nine  points  three years  after the FSAL. Most of that
growth, moreover,  was in quasi-money  (time,  savings,  and foreign  currency  deposits  of
resident  sectors  other  than central  government).  At the beginning  of the period,  quasi-
money  represented  35%  of M2;  by the end, it comprised  42%. Apparently,  the macro
instability  and high interest  rates  that the Bank  disapproved  of were not sufficient  to
substantially  discourage  intermediation.  In short, the predictability  of inflation  may  have
made  the macro  environment  more  stable  than it appeared  at first glance. At the least, the
increase  in time and  savings  deposits  suggests  that a large  group of savers  were not overly
fearful  of price instability.
It was, however,  the nature  of this financial  deepening  that must have  troubled
Bank staff. While  M2 was expanding,  deposit  bank credit  to the private  sector was
declining. DBPC/GDP  stood at 16.3%  in the year of the loan. Three years  later it was
only 11.6%. In other words, financial  deepening  was occurring,  but primarily  in the public
banking  institutions  that the Bank was laboring  unsuccessfully  to reform. Given  the
institutional  problems  highlighted  by the President's  Report, it is unlikely  that any
additional  savings  implied  by the surge in M2 were mobilized  as efficiently  as they might
54have been. It is, however,  also  true that annual  growth in real GDP continued  at 3-5% .
One could  argue that. by re-capitalizing  its ailing  public  banking  institutions,  Tanzania
unwittingly  propped  up its rickety  financial  system  enough  to take advantage  of conditions
favorable  to financial  reform. Would  the problems  of these institutions  recur? Probably,
given  the lack of institutional  development. However,  the Tanzanian  experience  suggests
that, even  when  institutional  strengthening  is done poorly,  favorable  initial  conditions  may
bring  about post-intervention  financial  deepening  although,  as noted, that deepening  may
not be a very  reliable  indicator  of financial  sector health.
Tanzania  and Pakistan  provide  an interesting  contrast. Some  financial  deepening
occurred  in the wake  of each  of these FSALs,  but for very different  reasons. In the
Tanzanian  case,  initial  conditions  were relatively  favorable  -- inflation  was a bit high,  but
predictable;  the banking  sector was relatively  under-developed;  and the economy  was
relatively  open to intemational  trade. However,  with respect  to institutional  development
in the financial  sector, little  progress  had been  made. The institutional  strengthening
components  of the FSAL, moreover,  were eventually  rated a failure  by the Bank. In
Pakistan,  the reverse  was true. Initial  conditions  were relatively  unfavorable:  although,  in
comparison  with other developing  countries,  macro  instability  probably  wasn't as great a
problem  as some of the Bank documents  suggested,  inflation  may  have  been a bit less
predictable  than in Tanzania;  international  trade accounted  for a smaller  fraction  of
economic  activity;  and the private  banking  sector was better developed. The Bank gave
the Government  of Pakistan  high marks,  however,  for the institutional  development
55achieved  both prior to and during  the course  of the FSAL, although  a fuller  assessment  of
the sustainability  of those  reforms  awaits  the PAR.
To be sure, three  years  after the FSAL,  the financial  deepening  in each  case
differed  -- in Tanzania,  M2/GDP  increased  by over eight  points;  in Pakistan,  that figure
was about  2.5 points. On the basis of these cases  (and the models  of the previous
section),  it does seem  reasonable  to conclude,  however,  that institutional  development  can
have  an impact  on financial  deepening  distinct  from macro  and financial  sector pre-
conditions.  The results  suggest  that, provided  some  minimum  level  of price level  stability
(or predictability)  is achieved,  it is reasonable  for the Bank  to continue  to devote  effort
both to developing  an environment  amenable  to reform,  and to actual  institutional
strengthening.  The environmental  effects  may  be larger,  or more immediate,  than  the
institutional,  but, if possible,  neither  should  be neglected.
V. Conclusions
The explosion  in the Bank's (and other development  banks') financial  sector
adjustment  operations  is a relatively  recent phenomenon.  As a result, we lack  the data
necessary  to divine  what works, at least to a degree  that eliminates  all doubt. As
researchers,  we can and should,  however,  evaluate  this "work in progress"  as the data
comes in over time. Our initial  inferences  may  subsequently  require  updating,  but we
clearly  owe policy  makers  and major development  banks even  tentative  conclusions.  It is
in this spirit  that I catalogue  the following  observations:
56(1) Since 1990,  the nature of Financial  Sector Adjustment  Loans (the World
Bank's primary  instrument  for financial  sector intervention)  has changed  slightly,
but perceptibly.  Although  the interventions  tend to focus on the same six reform
areas  -- interest  rate distortions,  prudential  regulations,  bank supervision,  bank re-
capitalization,  bank privatization,  and non-bank  financial  regulations  -- re-
capitalization,  privatization,  and supervision  were more heavily  emphasized  in later
interventions.  Reform  areas  that relate less  directly  to the operations  of banking
institutions  such as companies  laws, capital  account  liberalization,  and money
market  development  have  increasingly  become  the province  of lending  instruments
other than  the FSAL.
(2) The change  in FSALs  coincided  with a decline  in post-intervention
performance  as reflected  in financial  deepening.
(3) Declining  post-intervention  performance  in post-1990  lending  cannot  be
attributed  solely  to initial  macroeconomic  and financial  sector conditions  in the
recipient  country.
(4) Controlling  for initial  macroeconomic  and financial  sector conditions,  certain
types  of reforms,  especially  those that dealt with prudential  regulations,  were
associated  with relatively  large  increases  in M2/GDP. Those  dealing  with re-
capitalization  have also been  relatively  successful,  especially  when  they also
tackled  prudential  regulations  and/or  banking  supervision.  However,  those that
focused  on supervision  did not, on average,  substantially  outperform  those  that did
not. In addition,  reform  focused  on bank privatization  was associated  with much
less  financial  deepening  three years  after intervention.'
(5) Aside  from reform  aimed  at institutional  strengthening,  the reform
environment  itself  had a substantial  impact  on intervention  outcomes. Financial
deepening  was positively  associated  with openness  to trade, low inflation,  and an
initially  under-developed  financial  sector. Unfortunately,  unlike  in the growth
literature,  the positive  impact  of openness  to trade was not robust  across
alternative  measures  of trade., While,  for at least one of the countries  in the sample
(Venezuela),  it might  be argued  that imports  as a percentage  of GDP was the more
reliable  indicator  of openness,  it is troubling  that the results do not also hold for
exports and the Summers-Heston  measure of openness  to trade. More damning,
perhaps,  the openness  result  was not robust to the inclusion  of observations  where
inflation  was especially  high.
90  It was, however,  often  unclear  what form privatization  actually  took. In some
"privatizations,"  only a small  portion of the bank's assets are sold.  In others, the bank's
governing  board  is altered  only slightly  (if at all).
57(6)  As the Bank's operational directives suggest, some macroeconomic stability is
important for the success of financial sector interventions, especially those that
incorporate interest rate liberalization.
(7)  Given a minimum  acceptable level of macroeconomic stability, post-
intervention financial deepening can be associated with either favorable initial
conditions or successful institutional strengthening, or both. As the case studies
indicated, slight financial deepening has occurred in instances when initial
conditions were unfavorable but institutional reforms were well implemented. In
other instances, institutional reform was disappointing but substantial deepening
occurred on the strength of favorable initial conditions.
For the lending practitioner, these results may form the basis of more realistic
expectations for projects.  The financial deepening associated with some types of reform
may be harder to achieve, and, in some environments, reforms may need to progress more
slowly than in others.  This does not, however, imply that reform should be avoided or
postponed.  The Bank should recognize that its efforts either to strengthen financial
institutions or to provide an enabling environment for reform each appear to exert a
positive influence on project outcomes.  As other authors have also suggested, while it
may be best to move more aggressively on financial  reform when macroeconomic
circumstances are favorable, "visible" reform such as interest rate de-regulation or
privatization should be slowed rather than abandoned in less fortunate circumstances. By
contrast, less visible institution building efforts should be continued regardless of
macroeconomic conditions. 9'
In closing, I make a plea for better data.  Reliance on changes in M2/GDP as a
measure of post-intervention success is inadequate.  To evaluate institution building
91  Caprio, Atiyas, and Hanson (1994), p. 417.
58efforts  in the financial  sector, we need to know more  about post-intervention  portfolio
quality  (su a as the percent of portfolio  assets  that are non-performing  and measures  of
diversification  and capitalization),  banking  supervision  (the number  of supervisors,  their
salaries  and skill  levels),  and governance  (board  composition),  to name but a few major
areas. In addition,  firm  level  balance  sheet, income,  and production  data would  greatly
assist researchers  in evaluating  the impact  of financial  reforms  on the real sector. These
more detailed  measures  should  enable  us to better assess  whether  change  is actually  taking
place  as a result of Bank  interventions.  Finally,  the loan  instruments  themselves  may  be
the source of some  of the difficulties  in achieving  financial  sector adjustment. That  is,
financial  sector  development  is a process  that may  require  lending  instruments  that
disburse  slowly  as small  steps are achieved,  and that are less intimately  tied to a country's
balance  of payments  situation. Evaluating  that conjecture  is, however,  beyond  the scope
of this paper as all of the interventions  examined  were relatively  quick-disbursing  and tied
to balance  of payments  considerations.  Indeed,  the only  way  to generate  the data
necessary  to evaluate  slow-disbursing  instruments  may  be to experiment  with them.
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Country  Year  Countrv  Year  Type-Purpose
Albania  1994  Anmenia  1993  Instit. Building
Algeria  1991  Benin  1991  SAL II
Argentina  1993  Bulgaria  1992  SAL I
Bangladesh  1990  Burkina Faso  1993  Priv Sec Asst
Bolivia  1988  Chile  1988  SAL III
Ecuador  1987  China  1993  Fin Sec TA
Ghana  1991  Costa Rica  1985  SAL I
Ivory Coast  1992  Egypt  1992  Privatiz. TA
Jamaica  1991  Estonia  1995  Fin. Instit.
Kazakstan  1996  Guatemala  1993  EML
Kenya  1989  Guyana  1995  Fin Sec/Bus Env
Kyrgyz Republic  1996  Guinea  1995  Priv Sec Prom
Mexico  1989  Guinea Bissau  1987  SAL
Pakistan  1989  Honduras  1989  SAL I
Peru  1992  Hungary  1991  SAL II
Philippines  1989  India  1995  Fin Sec Dev
Poland  1993  Indonesia  1993  Fin Sec Dev
Rwanda  1991  Lao, PDR  1989  SAC
Senegal  1989  Latvia  1995  EFSL
Slovenia  1993  Lithuania  1995  EFSL
Tanzania  1991  Macedonia  1995  FESAC
Turkey  1988  Madagascar  1990  Fin Sec, Priv
Uganda  1993  Malawi  1991  Ent
Venezuela  1990  Mauritania  1995  Fin. Enter.
Morocco  1991  Fin. & Priv Sec
Mozambique  1994  Fin Sec Dev.
Nepal  1989  Fin Sec Capac.
Nicaragua  1992  SAC II
Paraguay  1995  Econ Recov
Russia  1994  Priv Sec Dev
Slovak Repub.  1994  Fin Instit Dev
Sri Lanka  1993  Econ Recov
Tunisia  1992  Priv Fin Dev
Uruguay  1989  Econ & Fin Ref
I__  _ _ _ _  _I__  _ _  _ _ _SAL  II
Loan Type Acronyms:  SAL - Structural Adjustment Loan  SAC-Structural Adjustment Credit  TA -
Technical Assistance  EFSL - Enterprise and Financial Sector Loan  EML -Economic Modernization
Loan  FESAC - Financial and Enterprise Sector Adjustment Credit
Other Abbreviations: Ref - Reformn;  Capac - Capacity; Enter - Enterprise; Instit - Institutions; Recov -
Recovery
62Appendix 2
FSALs:  Changes in Size, Comprehensiveness, and Prevalence
(1985-95)
(A).  Comprehensiveness and Prevalence
Table A2. 1 compares FSALs with non-FSAL financial sector adjustments
undertaken by the Bank over two time periods -- pre- and post-1990. 92 As one might
expect, on average, FSALs cover a wider number of reform areas (roughly 6) than do
non-FSALs (roughly 4).  This result is robust across both time periods.  Although there is
somewhat more variation in the number of reform areas among non-FSALs than among
FSALs, it appears safe to conclude that FSALs tend to be more comprehensive than other
Bank interventions. One might expect the need for comprehensive intervention to reflect
relatively poor initial conditions within a country's financial sector or, more generally,
within its macroeconomic framework. However, while the average conditions at the time
of the intervention are somewhat worse for FSALs than for non-FSALs, they are not
strikingly so (See Appendix 6 for details).
92  1990 is included in the post-90 time period.  The sample of non-FSAL financial
sector interventions was collected by OED.  While some judgment, no doubt, went into
determining what constituted a non-FSAL financial sector intervention, OED endeavored
to create as complete a list as possible. The comparisons here, therefore, are based on a
reasonably complete summary of the Bank's financial sector activities since the mid
eighties.  None of the interventions identified by OED commenced prior to  1985. A list of




Financial  Sect  r Adjustments
Pre- 1990  Post- 1990  Pre- 1990  Post  - 1990
Average Number
of Reform  6.38  6.43  4.00  4.74
Areas Covered  by  (1.19)*  (2.24)  (2.00)  (2.36)
Adjustment
Minimum  Areas  5  2  2  2
Maximum  Areas  8  9  7  12
Number  of  8  14  7  27
Loans  I  _I  I  I
*Standard  Deviations  in Parentheses
(B).  Importance  to Recipient  Country
In contrast  to initial  macro-  and financial  sector conditions  and the total number  of
reform  areas  covered  by interventions  (which  all have  remained  largely  unchanged),  the
size of the loans  and  the specific  reform  areas covered  have  changed  quite noticeably.
Although  the size of the FSALs  issued  before 1990  was slightly  larger,  on average,  than
for the latter  period,  the average  loan size per capita -- which  is, most likely,  a more
accurate reflection  of the importance  of a given  loan  to a recipient  country  -- nearly
doubled  after 1990  (Table  A2.2). 93 In addition,  within  the context of a country's total
funding  from the Bank, FSALs  assumed  a substantially  more important  role. The typical
pre-1990  FSAL  represented  about seven  percent  of the total Bank and IDA loans received
93  Average  loan sizes are measured  in nominal  dollars  which  overstates  the actual
disparity  between  the earlier  and later periods. After deflating  the nominal  figures  by the
United  States' consumer  price index,  however,  the changes  still  represent  a sizable
increase  in real  terms. If one deflates  by assuming  that the average  pre-90 loan  was issued
in 1987  and that the average-post-90  loan  was issued  in 1993,  the average  per capita loan
64by a country  prior to the intervention; 94 for post-  1990  FSALs,  the figure  was over
fourteen  percent of total funding. Similarly,  the average  FSAL  was about eight percent  of
total Bank/IDA  loans  outstanding  in the early  period  and seventeen  percent  in the latter
one.  Not only  has their  relative  size increased,  the sheer  number  of these interventions
has also  grown substantially.  There  were fourteen  FSALs  issued  after 1990,  only  eight
before. Among  non-FSAL  financial  sector interventions,  OED identified  seven  that began
prior to the dawn  of the new  decade  and twenty-seven  that began  subsequently.  In short,
the data  indicate  that financial  sector interventions,  especially  FSALs,  have become  an
increasingly  important  development  tool for the Bank.
size for the earlier  period,  as measured  in 1990  dollars,  was $7.36;  for the latter  it was
$11.39.
94  The total loan and credit  data in Table 1.2 are taken from the "Statement  of Bank
Loans  and IDA Credits"  which  accompanies  the President's  Report for each FSAL
("Report  and Recommendation  of the President  of the International  Bank  for
Reconstruction  and Development  and the International  Development  Association  to the
Executive  Directors  of the World  Bank"). While  similar  data exist  for non-FSAL
interventions,  many  of them also covered  issues  outside  the financial  sector. To attribute
the entire  loan  to financial  sector intervention  would,  therefore,  overstate  its importance
(for financial  adjustment  purposes)  within  the context of the recipient  country's Bank
portfolio. As a result, we compare  the sizes  of interventions  only  for FSALs.
65Table A2.2
FSAL  Characteristics  Over  Time
Loan/Credit  Characteristic  Pre-  1990  Post-  1990
Average  Loan Size  210.63  189.94
(noninal US$, millions)  (168.58)*  (147.75)
Average  Loan Size,  Per Capita  6.40  12.60
(nominal  USS)  (2.94)  (9.68)
Average  Loan Size  as a % of  6.81  14.04
Total Bank/IDA  Loans  Made  to  (2.95)  (9.19)
Countr)
Average  Loan  Size as a % of  8.41  17.38
Total Bank/IDA  Loans  (3.70)  (13.16)
Outstanding  I_I_I
* Standard  Deviations  in Parentheses
66Appendix  3: Changes  in Emphasis
FSALs Versus Non-FSALs
The groupings of reform areas for FSALs (Table 1.1) do not appear to apply
perfectly to non-FSAL financial  sector operations.  Although, in the post- 1990 period, the
average probability of inclusion  figure for each group exhibited the same descending order
as for FSALs (from group one down to four), there was substantial variation within
groups, and the differences between groups were far less pronounced. 95 At least three
disparities between FSALs and other interventions emerge from Table A3. 1. First, for the
reform areas in the ascending  group (privatization, re-capitalization, and supervision), the
disparities in probability of inclusion between FSALs and non-FSALs became much wider
over time.  In the pre-1990 period, the disparities were quite small -- re-capitalization and
supervision were emphasized  in FSALs and non-FSALs alike; privatization was yet to be
emphasized in either type of intervention. By contrast, in the latter period, these three
reform areas were among those that exhibited the widest disparities between the two
intervention types.  At first glance, interest rate distortions would also appear to fit this
pattern.  In the early period there was little disparity between the types of intervention; in
the latter, the probability of inclusion in an FSAL was much higher than for a non-FSAL.
However, whereas the widening disparities for the other three categories coincided with
increased emphasis, in the case of interest rate distortions it coincided with substantially
decreased emphasis. That is, interest rate distortions were becoming less emphasized in
95  For the post-1990 period, the average probability of inclusion for group one
reform areas among the non-FSALs was 56%; for group two it was 36%, for three 32%,
for four 19%. For FSALs, the figures were 83% for group one, 62% for group two, 47%
for three, and 17% for four.
67both types of interventions,  but that decline  was especially  pronounced  for non-FSALs. It
would  be incorrect,  therefore,  to interpret  the widening  disparity  between  FSALs  and non-
FSALs  with respect  to this area as evidence  that interest rate distortions  were becoming
an increasingly  important  component  of FSALs.
A second  finding  to emerge  from Table  A3.  1 is that, for the descending  group of
reforrn  areas (excluding  interest  rate distortions),  non-FSALs  closed  wide gaps relative  to
FSALs  in terms of probability  of inclusion.  FSALs  had a 31% higher  probability  of
addressing  prudential  regulations  than  did non-FSALs  in the early  period. After 1990,  that
advantage  was cut to only 15%. FSALs  were 59% more likely  to address  non-bank
regulations  than non-FSALs  prior to 1990,  only  34% more likely  thereafter. These
changes  were not, however,  attributable  to a changed  emphasis  in non-FSALs  --  the
inclusion  probabilities  in these  categories  remained  nearly  constant across  periods. Rather,
the gaps closed  because  of the substantially  decreased  emphasis  on these  categories  among
FSALs. Although  not in the descending  group of reforms,  indirect  monetary  control
displayed  a somewhat  similar  pattern. Non-FSALs  closed  the gap on FSALs  in that
category  by 23%. Unlike  prudential  and non-bank  regulations,  however,  the narrowing
gap was not attributable  to decreased  emphasis  among  FSALs  (the category  held  a
constant  50% inclusion  rate across  periods),  but to substantially  increased  emphasis  in
non-FSALs.
A third  group of reforms  switched  from being more heavily  emphasized  by FSALs
in the early period to being  more emphasized  by non-FSALs  in the latter. These
68categories make it especially  clear that FSALs have become increasingly focused on the
reform areas in the ascending and descending groups.  Rights and obligations of financial
agents, companies laws, and money market development were each slightly emphasized in
FSALs but never included in non-FSALs prior to 1990.  After 1990, almost the reverse
was true.  In the most dramatic case, the rights and obligations of financial agents went
from being an emphasized  reform area among FSALs (38% inclusion rate) to an
emphasized area among non-FSALs (44% inclusion rate).  Although this area was not
completely neglected by FSALs after 1990 (21% inclusion), responsibility  for these
reforms shifted noticeably away from them.  Similar swings occurred for companies laws
and money market development, although neither of those reforms were especially  strong
points of emphasis in either period for either type of reform.
69Table  A3.1
Changes in Non-FSAL  Financial Sector Adjustment Operations Over Time
(Broken Down By  Reform Area)
Reform  Area  Probability  of Inclusion  Probabilitv  of Inclusion  Change
Post-1990  Pre-1990
(Disparity  with FSALs  (Dispanty  with FSALs
in parentheses) 96 in parentheses)
Group  I
Bank Re-Capitalization  52% (-34)  71% (-4)  -19%
Bank Supervision  59% (-20)  57% (-6)  +2%
Group  II
Prudential  Regulations  56% (-15)  57%  (-31)  -1%
Non-Bank  Regulations  30% (-34)  29% (-59)  +1%
Interest Rate Distortion  22% (-42)  71% (4)  -49%
Ind. Monetary  Control  37% (-13)  14% (-36)  +23%
Group m
Bank Privatization  22% (-28)  0%  (-13)  +22%
Other Bank Ins. Reform  41% (-2)  14%  (+1)  +27%
Group IV
Directed Credit  11%  (-18)  14%  (-24)  -3%
Differential  Bank Reg.  30% (+1)  29% (-9)  +1%
Central Bank Law  22% (-7)  43% (+18)  -21%
Rights/Obs.  Fin. Agents  44% (+23)  0% (-38)  +44%
Comparnies  Law  26% (+12)  0% (-25)  +26%
Liberalize  Capital  Acct.  7% (-7)  0% (0)  +7%
Money  Market Dev.  11%  (+11)  0% (-13)  +11%
Foreign Ownership  4% (+4)  0% (0)  +4%
l  ________________  N=27  N=7
Disparity  calculated  by subtracting  the reform  category's non-FSAL  inclusion  rate
from its FSAL inclusion  rate.
70Appendix 4
Probability of Reform, Broken Down Bv Reform Area
Reform  Area  Probability  of Inclusion  Probabilit, of Inclusion  Difference
in a FSAL  in a Non-FSAL
Areas That FSALs  Are
Substantially More
Likely to Include
Non-Bank  Fin. Regs.  73%  29%  +44%
Interest  Rate Distortions  68%  32%  +36%
Bank Re-Capitalization  82%  56%  +26%
Prudential  Regulations  77%  56%  +21%
Directed  Credit  32%  12%  +20%
Bank Privatization  36%  18%  +18%
Ind. Monetary  Control  50%  32%  +18%
Bank Supervision  73%  59%  +14%
Areas That FSALs Are
Less or About As
Likely to Include
Differential  Reg.  Banks  32%  29%  +3%
Liberalize  Capital  Acct.  9%  6%  +3%
Central Banking  Law  27%  26%  +1%
Other Bank Inst Reform  32%  35%  -3%
Foreign  Ownership  0%  3%  -3%
Money  Market  Dev.  5%  9%  4%
Rights/Obs.  Fin. Agents  27%  35%  -8%
Companies  Law  2  1%  32%  -11%
71Appendix  5:  FSALs  vs. Non-FSALs
Financial  Sector  Indicators,  1985-95
Although  missing  data problems  cut the sample  in half,  the remaining  observations
make  it clear  that, in terns of M2/GDP,  LL/GDP, 97 DBPC/GDP 98 and  Fixed  Capital
Formation  as a percentage  of GDP (FCF/GDP),  the rate of post-intervention  improvement
was dramatically  greater  for FSALs  than non-FSALs  (Table  A5.  1). In some  cases,  the
rate of improvement  for FSALs  was more  than  four times greater  than that of non-FSALs.
For example,  three years  after  the intervention,  M2/GDP  and  FCF/GDP  had increased  by
4.65 and 1.51%,  respectively  for FSALs.99  For non-FSALs,  the figures  were 0.95 and
0.28%.  Similar  results  obtain  for LL/GDP. While  non-FSALs,  on average,  have  had a
positive  (if more muted)  impact  than  FSALs  with  respect  to those three variables,  there
has been hardly  any improvement  with respect  to DBPC/GDP  (.05%). By contrast,  the
average  improvement  in DBPC/GDP  in the wake of an FSAL  was 2.85%.
With  respect  to central  bank credit  to the private sector as a percentage  of GDP
(CB/GDP),  there is also a marked  disparity  between  FSALs  and non-FSALs. Presumably,
a high percentage  reflects  substantial  state involvement  in credit  markets  which  is likely  to
have  adverse  effects  on capital  allocation. The successful  intervention  would,  therefore,
reduce  this figure. On this measure,  however,  non-FSALs  have outperformed  FSALs.
For non-FSALs  the reduction  in CB/GDP  was 0.81%  three years after  the typical
97  Liquid  liabilities  as a percentage  of GDP.
9s  Deposit  bank claims  on the private sector as a percentage  of GDP.
99  Improvements  are relative  to initial  conditions  which  were computed  as the
average  of the year of the intervention  and the prior year.
72intervention;  for FSALs  there was almost  no reduction  (.06%). The disparity  may  be
reflective  of the differential  focus of the two types of interventions.  Recall  that, among
non-FSALs,  central  bank reform  was much more  prevalent  than among  FSALs prior to
1990. On average,  neither  type of reform  has had success  in increasing  private  credit
issued  by non-bank  financial  intermediaries  as a percentage  of GDP (NB/GDP).
Table  A5.1
Performance  Indicators,  FSALs  vs. Non-FSALs
Indicator  FSALs  Non-FSALs
(%  hange)  _(%  Cang
3 Yrs. After  Measured  by  3 Yrs After  Measured  by
Intervention  Indicator's  Intervention  Indicator's
Avg.  Level  in  Avg.  Level  in
the  3 yrs.  the 3 yrs.
after  the  after  the
project  project
M2 as %  of gdp  +4.65 (N=12)  +2.80 (N=12)  +0.95  (N=13)  +1.09 (N=13)
Liquid  Liabilities  as %  of gdp  +4.87  (N=9)  +3.22  (N=9)  +2.99  (N=7)  +1.29 (N=13)
Dep Bank Priv Cred  as %  of gdp  +2.85  (N=12)  +1.48 (N=12)  +0.05 (N=12)  -0.59  (N=12)
Non  Bank Priv  Cred  as %  of gdp  -0.41 (N=12)  -0.22 (N=12)  -0.27  (N=I  1)  -0.22 (N=11)
Cen Bank  Priv Cred  as %  of gdp  -0.06 (N=12)  -0.04 (N=12)  -0.81  (N=12)  -0.76  (N=12)
Fixed Cap. Form.  as % of gdp  +1.51 (N=13)  +0.98 (N=13)  +0.28 (N=13)  +0.43  (N=13)
Although  the IFS data are especially  sketchy  in this area, FSALs  and non-FSALs
alike  appear  to have had some success  in correcting  interest rate distortions. Three years
after  intervention,  real deposit  rates had increased  by an average  of 37% in the six FSAL
countries  in which  they  were originally  negative;  the increase  left four of the countries
with a positive  real deposit  rate, all but one of those in the 0-5% range (Venezuela's  rate
was 15%). Another  of the six,  Turkey,  maintained  a negative  real deposit  rate but showed
substantial  improvement  (from -14% to -3%). Only  Ecuador showed  no improvement
(moving  from -3% to -5%). In the three non-FSAL  countries  where rates were negative
at the time of intervention,  increases  averaged  a whopping  495.2%. That average  masks
substantial  variation. Two of the countries  (Hungary  and Benin)  experienced  five to seven
73percent increases;  Nicaragua  had a 1472.7%  increase. After  their moderate  increases,
Hungary  and Benin  had real  interest rates of  1.4%  and 2.6%, respectively;  Nicaragua's
remarkable  improvement  left it with a 0.3% real deposit  rate.  Although  data is available
for only  nine  cases  in which  real deposits  were severely  repressed,  the improvements  after
both types  of interventions  were substantial.  It may  be that correcting  interest  rate
distortions,  a point  of emphasis  in early  interventions,  is a reform  for which  bank
interventions  are especially  well-suited  regardless  of their type. However,  with respect  to
deposit  bank credit  to the private  sector and a number  of other general  indicators  of depth
in the financial  sector,  the typical  FSAL  appears  to have  out-performed  the typical  non-
FSAL. While  it appears  that neither  type of intervention  has been  particularly  effective  in
increasing  non-bank  financial  intermediation,  non-FSALs  have  been slightly  more  effective
in one area -- reducing central bank credit to the private sector.
100  As described  in the text, however,  the Chilean  observation  is largely  responsible
for this last result.
74Appendix  6:  Initial  Financial  Sector  and Macroeconomic  Conditions
FSAL  Recipients  Versus  Non-FSAL  Recipients
Initial  financial  conditions  as measured  by deposit  banks' credit  to the private
sector as a percentage  of GDP  (DBPC/GDP)  and  the ratios of both M2 and liquid
liabilities  to GDP (M2/GDP  and LL/GDP,  respectively)  indicate  that FSALs  were typically
undertaken  in countries  with slightly  less  developed  financial  sectors  than in non-FSAL
countries.'10  The figures  for non-FSAL  countries,  however,  are driven  by two
observations,  Egypt and China. Those  are the only  two countries  that produced  a
DBPC/GDP,  M2/GDP,  or LL/GDP  figure  higher  than 67%. China's  M2/GDP  figure  was
95.8%;  its LL/GDP  was 89.5%. Egypt's LL/GDP  was 86.5%;  its M2/GDP  was 84.5%.
For reference,  the sample  averages  were 32.5%  for M2/GDP,  21.6% for DBPC/GDP,
and 30.1%  for LL/GDP. Substantial  state involvement  in China's  banking  sector makes  it
unlikely  that the figures  derived  from the IMF data are reflective  of a developed  financial
sector, at least not in a typical  free market  sense. With respect  to Egypt, the Bank  has
noted previously  that their  high financial  ratios  are not reliable  indicators  of a developed
101  The source  of the DBPC,  M2, LL, and GDP data is the IMF's International
Financial  Statistics  Yearbook  (1996). DBPC includes  all assets of deposit  money  banks
classified  as claims  on the private sector. M2 includes  the sum  of all currency  held  outside
of banks,  demand  deposits  other than those of the central  government,  and time, savings,
and foreign  currency  deposits  of "resident  sectors other than  the central  government."
Liquid  liabilities  include  M2 plus demand  and interest bearing  liabilities  of non-bank
financial  intermediaries  such as savings  banks,  postal savings  institutions,  and finance
companies. In the individual  country  data, DBPC data are reported on line  22d, M2 data
on line  351, and LL data on 551. The macroeconomic,  interest rate, and population  data
used in this study are also drawn  from these country  tables. For many  of the countries
that received  financial  sector assistance  from the Bank, some  of this data is nissing. As a
result,  the number  of observations  in the FSAL vs. non-FSAL  categories  is not necessarily
consistent  across  indicators  (see Table  A6.  1, for example).
75financial  sector. Rather,  much  like  in many socialist  economies,  high  M2/GDP  and
LL/GDP  figures  represent  a "monetary  overhang"  born of severe financial  repression.' 02
Egypt's DBPC/GDP  figure  of only  22% (far closer  to the sample  average)  is clearly  a
much  more accurate  reflection  of the state of development  of its financial  sector. When
the non-FSAL  figures  are re-computed  excluding  both China  and Egypt, there is much  less
to choose  from in terms of average  initial  financial  sector conditions  between  the two
types of interventions  -- the deposit  bank private  credit  figures  are about 20% for each
sub-sample,  the M2 and liquid  liabilities  figures  about 30%.
With respect  to average  macroeconomic  conditions  at the time of the intervention,
comparisons  between  the FSAL  and non-FSAL  samples  are also inconclusive.  Whereas
the average  growth  rate in real GDP was slightly  higher  (4.4%  versus 3.1%)  and the
inflation  rate slightly  lower  (18% versus  25%) among  the non-FSAL  countries,  the current
account  deficit  among  FSAL  countries  tended  to be somewhat  lower (3.0%  versus 5.8%).
Admittedly,  there is substantial  variation  in initial  macroeconomic  conditions  among  the
non-FSAL  countries  (as indicated  by the relatively  large sample  standard  deviations). This
clouds  the interpretation  of the averages  somewhat;  however,  it appears  doubtful  that the
relatively  comprehensive  nature  of FSALs  can be attributed  solely  to poor initial
conditions -- either financial or macroeconomic - in the recipient country. Moreover,
102  "Egypt: Financial  Policy  for Adjustment  and Growth,"  Volume  I (Policy
Environment),  World  Bank, Country  Operations,  Middle  East and North Africa  Region,
(1993), p. 3.
76similarities  in initial  conditions  among  FSAL  and non-FSAL  countries  persisted  across
both time periods (pre- and post-  1  990).' 03
Table A6.1
Average Conditi  ons at Time of Intervention, FSALs vs. Non-FSALs
Variable  FSALs  Non-FSAL Financial  Sector
Adjustments
Financial Sector Conditions  Full Sample  Full Sample  Outliers
Omitted' 04
Deposit Bank Credit as a % of  18.24%  24.85%  21.75%
GDP  (9.47)  (19.12)  (12.84)
N=21  N=22  N=21
M2 as a % of GDP  26.85%  37.73%  32.74%
(10.75)  (21.87)  (14.89)
N=21  N=23  N=21
Liquid Liabilities as a % of GDP  27.44%  33.02%  28.16%
(13.86)  (25.02)  (19.38)
N=13  N=12  N=11
Macroeconomic  Conditions
GDP Growth Rate  3.14  4.39
(3.65)  (5.05)
N=17  N=23
Inflation  25.13%  18.38%
(20.64)  (25.83)
N=21  N=26
Current Account Surplus/Deficit  -2.99  -5.79
as a % of GDP  (5.94)  (12.24)
N=21  N=21
* Standard Deviations in Parentheses
103  For example, among FSAL countries the average DBPC/GDP was 19.5% prior to
1990 and 17.5% thereafter.  Prior to  1990, the non-FSAL country average was 23.1%;
post-90 it was 21.2%.  Although the post-90 FSAL countries do have the lowest average
initial development, the disparities are again not particularly striking. Indeed, the
regression results presented below indicate that these disparities explain only a portion of
the variation in outcomes.
104  Observations for China and Egypt were omitted as described above in the text.
77Appendix 7a.
Construction  of Institutional  Indices
(ICRG)
ICRG Indicators
Quality of the Bureaucracy:
High scores indicate "autonomy from political pressure" and  "strength and expertise
to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services"; also
existence of an "established mechanism for recruiting and training."  Scored 0-6.
Corruption  in Government:
Lower scores indicate "high government officials are likely to demand special
payments" and "illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of
government" in the form of "bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange
controls, tax assessment, policy protection, or loans."  Scored 0-6.
Rule of Law:
This variable "reflects the degree to which the citizens of a country are willing to
accept the established institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes."
IHigher  scores indicate "sound political institutions, a strong court system, and provisions
for an orderly succession of power."  Lower scores indicate "a tradition of depending on
physical force or illegal means to settle claims." Upon changes in government in countries
scoring low on this measure, new leaders "may be less likely to accept the obligations of
the previous regime. Original variable name in ICRG is "law and order tradition."  Scored
0-6.
Expropriation  Risk:
Assessment of risk of "outright confiscation" or "forced nationalization."  Scored 0-10,
with lower scores for higher risks.
Repudiation  of Contracts  by Government:
Indicates the "risk of a modification in a contract taking the form of a repudiation,
postponement, or scaling down" due to " budget cutbacks, indigenization  pressure, or a
change in government economic and social priorities."  Scored 0-10, with lower scores for
higher risks.
ICRG Index:
The sum of the preceding five variables, with the first three transformed into ten-point
scales.
Source: Knack and Keefer (1995), pp. 225-6.
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Measures the "speed and efficiency of the civil service including processing customs
clearances, foreign exchange remittances and similar applications."  Scored 0-4, with
higher scores for greater efficiency.
Nationalization Potential:
Measures risk of "expropriation for no compensation" and "preferential treatment for
nationals."  Scored 0-4, with higher scores for lower risks.
Contract Enforceability:
Measures the "relative degree to which contractual agreements are honored and
complications presented by language and mentality differences." Scored 0-4, with higher
scores for greater enforceability.
Infrastructure Quality:
Assesses "facilities for and ease of communication between headquarters and the
operation, and within the country," as well as quality of transportation.  Scored 04,  with
higher scores for superior quality.
BERI Index:
Sum of the preceding four variables.
Source:  Knack and Keefer (1995), p. 226.
79Appendix 8
Post-Intervention Change in M2/GDP, Regression Results
Re-Capitalization, Supervision, and Prudential Regulations
Explanatorn  Macro + Financial + Trade + Bank  Macro + Financial + Trade
Variable  Supervision  + Re-Capitalization  + Prudential Regulations  + Re-
Capitalization
_____  _____  ____(25)  (26)  (27)  (28)
Constant  -9.83  -6.72  -9.80  -6.75
(1.51)  (1.77)  (1.50)  (1.79)
Group 1  5.57  5.47
(1.35)  (1.32)
Group  2  2.11  2.18
(0.48)  (0.49)
Group 3  1.32  1.35
(0.29)  (0.30)
DBPC/GDPx  Infl.  -.0040  -.0038
(1.40)  (1.22)
IMP/GDP  0.29  0.36  0.29  0.36
(1.79)  (2.49)  (1.78)  (2.43)
Re-Capitalization  2.32  2.93  2.42  2.24
Only  (0.82)  (1.01)  (0.64)  (0.57)
Re-Capitalization  3.38  2.75
wI Supervision  (1.77)  (1.34)
Re-Capitalization  3.25  2.91
w/ Prud.  Regs.  (1.73)  (1.42)
Adj. R-Squared  .433  . .335  .426  .337
Number of  16  16  16  16
Observations
Note: t-statistics in parentheses; group dumnmies  defined in Table 2.2.
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Post-Intervention  Change in M2/GDP, Regression  Results
Explanatorv
Variable  (29)  (30)  (31)  (32)  (33)  (34)  (35)  (36)
(I) Constant  -3.06  -2.11  -1.52  -6.08  -6.93  -3.32  -5.67  4.29
(0.80)  (0.58)  (0.44)  (1.63)  (1.74)  (0.93)  (1.45)  (1.05)
(2) Group 1  7.69  7.99  8.07  7.64  8.45  8.80  7.60  8.20
(2.44)  (2.52)  (2.71)  (2.73)  (2.75)  (2.90)  (2.64)  (3.45)
(3) Group  2  2.98  3.34  1.75  3.52  4.32  2.80  3.13  0.13
(0.90)  (0.89)  (0.48)  (1.19)  (1.35)  (0.89)  (1.00)  (0.05)
(4) Group  3  0.82  0.93  1.63  1.08  1.48  0.84  0.91  0.99
(0.26)  (0.28)  (0.53)  (0.39)  (0.51)  (0.28)  (0.31)  (0.44)
(5) IMP/GDP  .011  .021  -.007  .083  .095  -.017  .074
(0.09)  (0.17)  (0.06)  (0.74)  (0.83)  (.140)  (0.63)
(6) Prudential  1.74  1.01
Regs.  (0.74)  (0.56)
(7) Privatization  -.201
(0.07)
(8) Privatization  -7.15
w/out  Prud.  Regs.  (1.53)
(9) Privatization  2.42
with Prud. Regs.  (0.80)
(10) Re-  4.02
Capitalization  (2.16)
(11) Re-cap.  w/out  6.13
Prudential  Regs.  (1.71)
(12) Re-cap.  with  3.70
Prudential  Regs.  (1.89)
(13) Supervision  2.98
(1.45)
(14) Re-cap.  with  3.09
Supervision  (1.12)
(15) Re-cap.  w/out  4.30
Supervision  (2.14)
(16) Openness  to  -.120
Trade  (2.07)
(Summers  Heston)
Adj. R-Squared  .245  .220  .315  .395  .375  .310  .364  .539
Number of  22  22  22  22  22  22  22  21
Observations
Note:  t-statistics  in parentheses;  group  dummies defined  in Table  2.2.
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